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Abstract
Schulze and ranked-pairs elections have received much attention recently, and the former
has quickly become a quite widely used election system. For many cases these systems have
been proven resistant to bribery, control, or manipulation, with ranked pairs being particularly
praised for being NP-hard for all three of those. Nonetheless, the present paper shows that with
respect to the number of candidates, Schulze and ranked-pairs elections are fixed-parameter
tractable to bribe, control, and manipulate: we obtain uniform, polynomial-time algorithms
whose degree does not depend on the number of candidates. We also provide such algorithms
for some weighted variants of these problems.
1 Introduction
Schulze voting [30], though relatively recently proposed, has quickly been rather widely adopted.
Designed in part to well-handle candidate cloning, its users include the Wikimedia foundation, the
Pirate Party in a dozen countries, Debian, KDE, the Free Software Foundation Europe, and dozens
of other organizations, and Wikipedia even asserts that “currently the Schulze method is the most
widespread Condorcet method” [33].
Although the winner-choosing process in Schulze voting is a bit complicated to describe, involving
minima, maxima, and comparisons of paths in the so-called weighted majority graph, Schulze [30]
proved that finding who won a Schulze election nonetheless is polynomial-time computable, and
Parkes and Xia [27] for the so-called destructive case and Gaspers et al. [15] for the so-called con-
structive case (extending a one-manipulator result for that case by Parkes and Xia [27]) proved
that the (unweighted coalitional) manipulation problem for Schulze elections is polynomial-time
computable. On the other hand, Parkes and Xia [27] proved that for Schulze elections bribery is
NP-hard, and the work of Parkes and Xia [27] and Menton and Singh [24] established that for Schulze
elections 15 of the 22 benchmark control attacks are NP-hard.
Parkes and Xia also note that, by the work of [27,35,34], the ranked-pairs election system, which
is not widely popular but like Schulze has a polynomial-time winner-determination problem and like
∗A two-page extended-abstract version of this paper appeared in the Proceedings of the 12th International Con-
ference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2013) [18].
†Work done in part while at the University of Rochester’s Department of Computer Science.
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Schulze is based on the weighted majority graph, is resistant to (basically, NP-hard with respect
to) bribery, control under each of the control types they study in their paper, and manipulation.
Based on their discovery that ranked pairs is more broadly resistant to attacks than Schulze, the
fact that Schulze itself “is in wide use,” and the fact that there is “broad axiomatic support for both
Schulze and ranked pairs,” Parkes and Xia [27] quite reasonably conclude that “there seems to be
good support to adopt ranked pairs in practical applications.”
However, in this paper we show that the resistances-to-attack of Schulze and ranked pairs are
both quite fragile.
For each of the bribery and control cases studied by Parkes and Xia, Menton and Singh, and
Gaspers et al. for which they did not already prove Schulze voting to be in P, we prove that Schulze
voting is fixed-parameter tractable with respect to the number of candidates. (The (unweighted)
manipulation cases were already all put into P by these papers.) Fixed-parameter tractable (see [26])
means there is an algorithm for the problem whose running time is f(j)IO(1), where j is the number
of candidates and I is the input’s size. This of course implies that for each fixed number of candidates,
the problems are in polynomial time, but it says much more; it implies that there is a global bound
on the degree of the polynomial running time, regardless of what the fixed number of candidates is.
That result might lead one to even more strongly suggest the adoption of ranked pairs as an
attractive alternative to Schulze. However, although for ranked pairs Parkes and Xia proved all the
types of bribery, control, and manipulation they studied to be NP-hard, we show that every one of
those cases is fixed-parameter tractable (with respect to the number of candidates) for ranked pairs.
So even ranked pairs does not offer a safe haven from fixed-parameter tractability.
Our final results section, Section 7, looks at bribery and manipulation in the case of weighted
voting, and proves a number of results for that case. For example, for ranked pairs, we prove
that weighted constructive coalitional manipulation is fixed-parameter tractable with respect to the
combined parameter “number of candidates” and “cardinality of the manipulators’ weight set.” We
give evidence that this fixed-parameter tractability result cannot be extended to a general P result,
namely, we prove that weighted constructive coalitional manipulation is NP-complete for five or
more candidates. We also show that this “five” is optimal unless P = NP, by proving that this
problem is in polynomial time for four or fewer candidates.
2 Presentation of the Key Idea
Our fixed-parameter tractability proofs are of interest in their own right, because they face a very
specific challenge, which at first might not even seem possible to handle. We now describe in
relatively high-level terms what that challenge is and how we handle it.
Before we start that explanation, we need to present the definition of Schulze voting. Voters
will always vote by linear orders over the candidates; in doing that, we adopt the complete, tie-free
ordering case of Schulze used in the papers most related to this one [27,24,15]. Given the input
set of candidates and the set of votes over them (as linear orders), the weighted majority graph
(WMG) is the graph that for each ordered pair of candidates c and d, c 6= d, has an edge from c to
d having weight equal to the number of voters who prefer c to d minus the number of voters who
prefer d to c. Clearly, either all WMG edges have even weight or all WMG edges have odd weight,
and the weight of the edge from c to d is negative one times the weight of the edge from d to c.
The “strength” of a directed path between two nodes in the WMG is the minimum weight of all the
edges along that path. The strength can be negative. The Schulze election system is that candidate
c is a winner exactly if for each other candidate d it holds that there is some simple path from c to
d whose strength is at least as great as that of every simple path from d to c. A lovely result is that
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Figure 1: WMG for the election examples, with one edge from each pair left implicit. Those edges
are the reverse edges of the displayed edges, with a weight equal to negative one times the weight
of their displayed counterpart, e.g., the implicit edge from candidate 2 to candidate 4 has weight -4
and the implicit edge from candidate 3 to candidate 1 has weight 0.
the set of winners, under this definition, is always nonempty [30].
We now give a small Schulze-election example from Parkes and Xia [27], over the candidate set
{1,2,3,4}. Although the votes are not specified here, using McGarvey’s method [22] we can build
a profile of votes realizing the WMG of Figure 1. We will carefully explain McGarvey’s method
in Appendix B; for now we ask the reader to briefly take our claim on faith. Candidate 4 is the
sole Schulze winner, strictly beating each other candidate in best-path strength. For each other
candidate i, candidate 4 has a path to i of strength 6, but i’s strongest path to 4 has strength 2.
One of the most powerful tools to use in building algorithms establishing fixed-parameter
tractability is a result due to Lenstra, showing that the integer linear programming feasibility prob-
lem (henceforth, ILPFP) is in P if the number of variables is fixed [19]. Lenstra’s result, based on
the geometry of numbers, is very deep and so strong that intuition whispers it should not even be
true; yet it is.
Now, if within an appropriate-sized integer linear program with a number of variables
that was bounded by some function of the number of candidates we could capture our
bribery/manipulation/control challenges and the action of the election system, we would be home
free. Indeed, this has been done, for control, for such systems as plurality, veto, Borda, Dodgson,
and others (see the discussion on p. 338 of [10]). However, Schulze and ranked-pairs elections have
such extremely demanding definitions that they seem well beyond such an approach, and we have
not been able to make that approach work. So we have a challenge.
Fortunately, the literature provides a way to hope to approach even systems that are too hard to
directly wedge—together with the manipulative action—into an ILPFP. That approach is to define
some sort of structure associated with subcases of behavior/outcomes of an election system, such
that for each fixed number of candidates the number of such structures is bounded as a function
of the number of candidates (independent of the number of voters), yet such that for each such
structure we can wedge into an ILPFP the question of whether the given action can be made to
succeed in the system in a way that is consistent with that structure. If that can be done, then we
just loop over all such structures (for the given number of candidates), and for each of them build
and run the appropriate ILPFP.
This has not been done often, but it has been done for example by Faliszewski et al. [12], with
respect to some control problems, for the election system known as Copeland voting. And the
structure they used is what they called a Copeland Output Table, which is a collection of bits
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associated with the outcomes of the pairwise majority contests between the candidates.
Unfortunately, such output tables don’t seem to have enough information to support the case
of Schulze or ranked pairs. (However, see the comments at the start of Appendix A.) The natural
structure that would allow us to tackle our systems is the one the systems are based on, namely,
the WMG, and looping over all of those would allow us within the loop to easily write/run an
appropriate ILPFP to check the given case. However, that falls apart because the number of WMGs
is not bounded as a function of the number of candidates; the number also grows as a function of the
number of voters. The impossibility of looping over WMGs leaves us still faced with the challenge
of how to tackle our problems.
A key contribution of this paper is to show that the needle described above can be threaded—and
to thread it—for Schulze and ranked-pairs elections. In particular, we need to, for each of those
election systems, find a (winner-set certification) structure that on one hand is rich enough that for
each structure instance we can within an ILPFP check whether the given manipulative action can
lead to success in a way consistent with the case of which the particular instance of the structure
is speaking. Yet on the other hand, the structure must be so restrictive that the number of such
structures is bounded purely as a function of the number of candidates (independent of the number
of voters). In brief, we need to find, if one exists, a “sweet spot” that meets both these competing
needs.
We achieve this with structures we call Schulze winner-set certification frameworks (SWCFs)
and ranked pairs winner-set certification frameworks (RPWCFs). A Schulze winner-set certification
framework contains a “pattern” for how we can prove that a given set of candidates is the winner set
of a Schulze election. To do that, the structure for each winner a specifies, for each other candidate
b, a “strong path” γab from a to b in the WMG (recall that victory in Schulze elections is based on
having strong paths), and then—to establish that the other candidate b has no stronger path back
to a—for every simple path from b back to our candidate a the structure identifies a “weak link” (a
directed edge on that path) that will keep the path from being too strong; to be more specific, we
mean an edge on that path in the WMG such that its weight is less than or equal to that of every
edge in our allegedly quite strong path γab. (Now, keep in mind, at the time we are looping through
the structure, we will not even know how strong each link is, as the manipulation/bribery/control
will not yet even have happened; rather, the structure is specifying a particular pattern of victory,
and the ILPFP will have to check whether the given type/amount of manipulation/bribery/control
can bring to life that victory pattern.) Additionally, for each candidate a the structure claims is
not a winner, the structure will specify what rival b eliminates that candidate from the winner set
and then will outline a pattern for a proof that that is the case, in particular giving a “strong path”
from b to a and for each simple path from a to b our structure will specify a “weak link,” i.e., an
edge on that path from a to b whose weight in the WMG we hope will be strictly less than the
weight of all edges in the selected strong path from b to a; if all our hopes of this sort turn out to be
true (and that is among what the integer linear program will be testing, for each of our certification
framework’s structures), this proves that b eliminates a. Crucially, the number of structures in that
Schulze winner-set certification framework, though large, is bounded as a function of the number of
candidates. The certification framework, however, does not itself have its hands on the weights of
the WMG, and so the paths and edges it specifies are all given in terms of the self-loop-free graph,
on nodes named 1, 2, . . . , ‖C‖, that between each pair of distinct nodes has edges in both directions.
Since the candidate names are irrelevant in Schulze voting, we can change to those canonical names,
so that our Schulze structures are always in terms of those names.
Crucially, as noted above the number of structures in our Schulze winner-set certification frame-
work, though large, is bounded as a function of the number of candidates. Yet, also crucially,
this approach provides enough structure to allow a polynomial-sized (technically, it is actually a
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uniform-over-all-numbers-of-candidates polynomial multiplied by a constant that may depend on
the number of candidates; this does not trivialize the claim, since the ILPFP must work for all
numbers of voters) ILPFP to do the “rest” of the work, namely, to see whether by a given type of
attack we can bring to life the proof framework that a given instance of the structure sets out, as
to who the winners/nonwinners are in the Schulze election and why. Appendix A gives an alternate
winner certification framework that readers may wish to look at to get more of a sense of what
certification frameworks do and how they may look. That appendix’s certification framework is
closer in flavor to Copeland Output Tables than the approach above is, although as the appendix
discusses the alternative approach is both quite clear and quite subtle.
For ranked pairs, the entire approach is what we just described above, except the certification
framework we use is completely different than that used for Schulze. Ranked pairs is a method that
is defined in highly sequential terms, through successive rounds some of which add a relationship
between two candidates, and so our certification framework will be making extensive guesses about
what happens in each round (and about a number of other things). But again, we will ensure that
the number of such certification structures is bounded as a function of the number of candidates
(independent of the number of voters), yet each structure will give enough information that the rest
of the work can be done by an integer linear programming feasibility problem. Our notion of a
ranked pairs winner-set certification framework will be given in detail in Section 5.1.2.
3 Definitions
Schulze elections were defined in the previous section. We now define the quite different system
known as ranked pairs, due to Tideman (see [32]). The ranked-pairs winner is defined by a sequential
process that uses the weighted majority graph (WMG). We choose the edge in the WMG of greatest
weight, say from a to b, and fix in the eventual output that a must beat b; cases of ties, either
regarding what edge has the greatest weight, or regarding cases where (a, b) and (b, a) both are
weight zero, are handled as will be specified in footnote 1. We then remove the edges between a and
b from the WMG. We then iterate this process, except if the greatest remaining edge is one between
two candidates who are already ordered by earlier fixings of output ordering (this can happen, due
to transitivity applied to earlier fixings), then we discard the pair of edges between those candidates.
We continue until we have completely fixed a linear order.1 The candidate at the top of this linear
1There are two different types of ties that must be handled. One is when we get to a case when we are considering
an edge, and we don’t discard it, and the candidates tie (the edges between them are both 0); here, we break ties
using some simple ordering among the candidates. By simple, we mean feasible; there is a polynomial-time machine
that, given the candidates, outputs a linear ordering of them that is the ordering to use when breaking ties of this
sort. The second type of tie is when there is a tie as to what is the largest edge remaining in the WMG. In ties of that
sort, we use a simple—again, by simple we mean feasible, analogously to the first case—ordering among all unordered
pairs of candidates to decide which pair having a highest-weight edge still left is the one to next consider. If that
pair is {a, b} and both (a, b) and (b, a) have weight zero, either edge can be chosen to consider next, since which we
consider at this point among (a, b) and (b, a) makes no difference in the result of this step.
An at first seemingly tempting alternate approach to breaking ties would be to require as part of the input the
two types of tie-breaking orders discussed above. But that is highly unattractive, since that would require changing
the definitions of long-defined problems (manipulation, control, bribery), in order to add that extra input part. In
truth, the tie-breaking is being made, by us and the earlier papers, to be a part of ranked pairs; and so it should be
a feature or setting that is part of one’s version of ranked pairs, and should not be built in by hacking the notions
of manipulative actions. So to us, if one wants to speak about ranked pairs, one to be clear and complete must
also specify the two feasible tie-breaking functions that are needed to completely define the system. However, our
main results for ranked pairs, which are fixed-parameter tractability results, will all hold for all feasible tie-breaking
functions.
Here is an example of a pair of feasible tie-breaking functions. One could break ties between two candidates in
favor of the lexicographically larger. And one could break ties between two candidate pairs in favor of the pair with
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order is the winner under ranked pairs. Even if the first removed edge is from a to b and that edge
has positive weight, it is possible that a will not be the ranked pairs winner.
We give a small example of selecting the winner under ranked pairs. We again consider the
election with candidate set {1,2,3,4} and votes such that Figure 1 is the WMG. We will break
order-of-consideration ties (due to tied edge weights) between {a, b} and {c, d} in favor of which pair
has the lexicographically-larger larger-candidate-of-the-pair, and if they tie in that, on which has
the lexicographically-larger smaller-candidate-of-the-pair. Thus we handle the edges in the following
order: 3→2, 2→1, 4→1, 1→3, 4→2, 3→4. The output ordering will be set by those (3≻2, 2≻1,
etc.), except with 1→3 discarded due to transitivity. So under ranked pairs, 3 is the sole winner.
As mentioned earlier, our elections are specified by a set of candidates and voters (each vote is
a tie-free linear ordering of the candidates). The standard (also called “nonsuccinct”) approach to
the votes is that each comes in separately. In the succinct approach, which is meaningful only for
systems such as Schulze and ranked pairs that don’t care about voters’ names, each tie-free linear
ordering that is cast by at least one voter comes with, as a binary integer, the number of voters that
voted that way.
In our problems we will speak of making a candidate p a winner or precluding p from being a
winner. This is known as the nonunique-winner model or, in some papers, the co-winner model. If
one changes “a winner” into “the one and only winner,” that is what is known as the unique-winner
model.
The problem definitions we are about to give present the definitions for the nonsuccinct,
nonunique-winner case. However, the above two paragraphs make clear the very slight changes
needed to define the succinct, nonunique-winner case, the nonsuccinct, unique-winner case, and
the succinct, unique-winner case. For consistency with the literature, the wording of many of our
attack-problem definitions is taken directly from or modeled on the definitions given in [12]. In these
definitions, E will represent the election system.
Name: The constructive bribery problem for E elections and the destructive bribery problem for E
elections [9].
Given: A set C of candidates, a collection V of voters (specified via their tie-free linear orders over
C), a distinguished candidate p ∈ C, and a nonnegative integer k.
Question (constructive): Is it possible to change the votes of at most k members of V in such a
way that p is a winner of the election whose voter collection is V and whose candidate set is
C.
Question (destructive): Is it possible to change the votes of at most k members of V in such a
way that p is not a winner of the election whose voter collection is V and whose candidate set
is C.
In the literature, the above problem is often called the unweighted, unpriced bribery problem.
Name: The constructive manipulation problem for E elections and the destructive manipulation
problem for E elections [1,6].
the lexicographically-larger larger-candidate-of-the-pair, and when the larger members are the same in both pairs
then breaking the tie in favor of whichever pair has the lexicographically-larger smaller-candidate-of-the-pair. The
suggestion to use the candidate-vs.-candidate ordering to induce an ordering on the pairs—a suggestion our example
is consistent with—was made and used by the creator of ranked pairs, Nicolaus Tideman, in his book “Collective
Decisions and Voting: The Potential for Public Choice” [32].
6
Given: A set C of candidates, a collection V of voters (specified via their tie-free linear orders over
C), a voter collectionW (each starting as a blank slate), and a distinguished candidate p ∈ C.
Question (constructive): Is it possible to assign (tie-free linear order) votes to the members of
W in such a way that p is a winner of the election whose voters are the members of V and W ,
and whose candidate set is C.
Question (destructive): Is it possible to assign (tie-free linear order) votes to the members of W
in such a way that p is not a winner of the election whose voters are the members of V and
W , and whose candidate set is C.
In the literature, this is often called the unweighted coalitional manipulation problem. We will
sometimes refer to the members of the manipulative coalitionW as manipulators and to the members
of V as nonmanipulators.
As benchmarks, over time eleven “standard” types of control questions have emerged [2,17,
12], each with a constructive version and a destructive version. Four of the eleven are each of
adding/deleting (at most k, with k part of the input) candidates/voters. A fifth is so-called unlimited
adding of candidates. The remaining six are partition of candidates, runoff partition of candidates,
and partition of voters, each in both the model where first-round ties promote and in the model
where first-round ties eliminate. The benchmark types are modeled on situations from the real
world. For example, constructive control by adding voters models highly targeted get-out-the-vote
drives and constructive control by adding candidates models trying to draw into elections spoiler
candidates who will hurt your opponents. See for example [2,17,12] for a detailed discussion of the
motivations of the benchmark control types. We mention in passing that recent work [16] has shown
that in the nonunique-winner model two pairs of the eleven destructive types are pairwise identical
as to which instances they can be carried out on, while one pair is identical in the unique-winner
model.
Due to there being many control types, giving their definitions can take up a large amount of
space. In order to keep the paper self-contained for those who want more formal definitions, as
Appendix C we provide in their typically stated forms the definitions of all the control types. For
those who already know the definitions or at this point simply want a brief treatment (knowing
Appendix C is available with formal definitions), the rest of the present paragraph gives a short
overview of the flavor of the different benchmark control attacks. All these problems have as their
input an election, (C, V ), and a distinguished candidate p ∈ C. Constructive (destructive) control by
deleting voters—for a given election system, of course—also has a nonnegative integer k in the input
and asks whether there is a subset of V of cardinality at most k such that with that subset removed
p is (is not) a winner. Control by adding voters is analogous, except the input is the election, k,
and a set W of voters who can be added (but at most k can be added). Deleting candidates and
adding candidates are analogous to the voter cases, with a k as part of the input, and the only
twist is that in destructive control by deleting candidates, it is forbidden to delete p. Unlimited
adding of candidates is the same except there is no limit k. Constructive (destructive) partition
of voters, in the ties-promote model, asks whether there is a way of partitioning the voters into
two groups so that if all winners under the election system of each of those first-round elections
compete in a final election under the same election system in which all voters vote (with their votes
masked down to the remaining candidates), p is (is not) a winner. In its ties-eliminate variant, only
unique-winners of a first round election move forward. The runoff partition of candidates types are
analogous, except in the first round it is the candidates that are partitioned and all voters vote in
each of those subelections. Partition of candidates has just one side of the partition participating in
the first-round election, while the others get a bye to the final round.
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A problem is said to belong to the class FPT (is said to be fixed-parameter tractable, see [26]) with
respect to a parameter if there is an algorithm for the problem whose running time is f(j)IO(1), where
j is the input’s value of that parameter, f is a computable function, and I is the input’s size. Note
that this means that although the algorithm for larger values of j can have a bigger multiplicative
constant, the degree of the polynomial running time is uniformly bounded from above—there is some
single integer k such that regardless of the fixed j the algorithm for that parameter bound runs in
time O(Ik). Our parameter will almost always be the most natural one—the number of candidates.
In Section 7, we will have cases where our parameter is a tuple of features of the input rather than a
single feature, i.e., is a “combined” parameter (see [3, Chapter 9]). We stress that FPT should not
be confused with the class, of which it is a subset, XP. XP problems are in P for each fixed bound
on the parameter, but their degree can grow as that bound grows. Thus XP is a far less attractive
class, even though by brute force it is often clear that parameterized versions of voting problems fall
into it. However, our focus is firmly on the more demanding goal of establishing FPT results.
4 Related Work
The computational complexity of manipulation, bribery, and control for Schulze voting and ranked
pairs has been studied previously by Parkes and Xia, Xia et al., Menton and Singh, and Gaspers et
al. [27,35,24,15]. The work of Xia et al. and Parkes and Xia establishes (see also the table in [27]) that
for Schulze elections constructive and destructive bribery, constructive and destructive control by
adding and deleting voters, and constructive control by adding candidates are NP-complete, and that
ranked pairs has not only all these hardnesses but also has NP-completeness results for constructive
and destructive manipulation, for destructive control by adding candidates, and for constructive
and destructive control by deleting candidates. Menton and Singh (see Table 1 of [24]) studied
all remaining types of constructive and most types of destructive control for Schulze voting, and
their work establishes that NP-completeness holds additionally for constructive control by unlimited
adding of candidates, constructive control by deleting candidates, each variant of constructive con-
trol by partition or runoff partition of candidates, and each variant of constructive and destructive
control by partition of voters, and for the four cases of destructive control by partition or runoff par-
tition of candidates they show that polynomial-time algorithms exist.2 The (unweighted coalitional)
manipulation problem is shown to be in P for the destructive case by Parkes and Xia [27] and for
the constructive case by Gaspers et al. [15]. Gaspers et al. [15] prove that the weighted constructive
coalitional manipulation problem for Schulze elections is in polynomial time for each fixed number
of candidates. We observe that inspection of their paper immediately makes clear that they indeed
have even established the stronger claim that the weighted constructive coalitional manipulation
problem for Schulze elections is in the class FPT.3
2For Schulze, three of the 22 benchmark control cases—each clearly belonging to NP for Schulze—were left open
by the abovementioned papers and indeed even now these cases remain open as to whether they are in P, are NP-
complete, or have some other complexity: destructive control by adding candidates, destructive control by deleting
candidates, and destructive control by unlimited adding of candidates. However, for each of those three (and all other
of the benchmark control cases), we obtain membership in FPT.
3Briefly, the reason their algorithm for the weighted constructive coalitional manipulation problem for Schulze
elections is clearly even an FPT algorithm is as follows. Their algorithm is using the fact, observed independently
by Menton and Singh [23] and Gaspers et al. [15], that for the nonunique-winner model, weighted constructive
coalitional manipulation problem for Schulze elections, if one can make a given candidate a winner then there is a
set of manipulative votes in which all manipulators vote the same way and that candidate is selected as a winner.
Once one has this, an FPT algorithm is obtained simply by cycling over all possible preference orders, for each seeing
whether, if that is what all the manipulators cast as their vote, the given candidate becomes a winner. And that is
precisely what their short, elegant algorithm is doing for this case.
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All the results in the two papers involving Xia are in the unique-winner model. Ranked pairs is
resolute (has exactly one winner), as Parkes and Xia frame it, and we follow their framing. And so
the nonunique-winner and the unique-winner models are in effect the same for ranked pairs. Schulze
is not resolute, but although Parkes and Xia’s results on that are in the unique-winner model, they
comment that their results all also hold in the nonunique-winner model. Gaspers et al. study both
the nonunique-winner model and the unique-winner model. Menton and Singh use the nonunique-
winner model as their basic model, as do we in the present paper. To us the nonunique-winner
model is more attractive in not requiring a tie-breaking that, especially in symmetric cases, is often
arbitrary and can change the flavor of the system. However, our main FPT results are proven by
a loop approach over ILPFPs (integer linear programming feasibility problems), and it is clear that
a straightforward adjustment to these will also handle the unique-winner cases. The key difference
between our work and all the abovementioned work is that our work is in general looking at the
complexity of these problems when parameterized by the number of candidates, and for this we
give FPT algorithms. The earlier papers primarily looked at unbounded numbers of candidates and
obtained both P and NP-completeness results; our contribution is that for all their NP-complete
cases, we show membership in FPT.
As to technique, the closest precursors of this paper are two papers by Faliszewski et al. [12,
10]. Those, like us, use a loop over ILPFPs. The main differences between that work and ours
is that (a) they deal with control, and we also are concerned with bribery and manipulation, and
(b) as explained in detail in Section 2, their type of loop-over structure isn’t flexible enough for our
cases, and the natural structure for us to loop over generates a number of objects not bounded in
the number of candidates, and so in this paper we find a middle ground that allows the loop to be
over a bounded-in-‖C‖ number of objects yet provides enough information in the objects so as to
allow the ILPFPs to complete the checking of whether success is possible. For a different type of
attack known as “swap bribery” and a different election system, Dorn and Schlotter [7] have recently
employed what in effect (although implicitly) is a loop over ILPFPs, and they mention in passing
without details that that swap bribery approach should apply to ranked pairs.4
Taking an even broader perspective, this work is part of a line that looks at the complexity
of elections in the context of bounds on the number of candidates, a study that for example has
been pursued famously by Conitzer, Sandholm, and Lang [6] regarding at what candidate numbers
complexity jumps from P to NP-complete. The particular focus on FPT algorithms, and maintaining
a uniform degree bound over all values of bounds on the number of candidates, is part of the
important field of parameterized complexity (see [26], see [4] for a survey on this approach for
4Dorn and Schlotter [7] separately mention in passing and without definitions or details that their approach should
apply to manipulation and some unspecified variants of control. If one takes as implied there the combination of
their ranked-pairs aside and their other attacks-aside (and they in their paper don’t explicitly assert that), then
that without-details assertion pair, combined, overlaps some of our ranked-pairs results regarding control (though
they do not specify which control types they are speaking of). However, in contrast, we here actually provide a
certification framework handling the ranked pairs election system. We believe that their results, even if looking at
the combination of their asides, don’t overlap our main work on manipulation, since they speak of “weighted and
unweighted manipulation,” but by that undefined-there use they seem to mean a weaker notion of manipulation than
that used in the present paper, namely, we are looking at coalitional manipulation, but they seem to be referring to
noncoalitional manipulation. (The reason we say this is that for the weighted case of coalitional manipulation, the
natural ILPFPs one would generate have neither their number of variables nor their number of constraints “bounded
in the number of candidates independently of the number of voters.” Beyond this, for ranked pairs we will prove,
as Theorem 7.3, that weighted coalitional manipulation is NP-complete for each fixed number of candidates starting
at five; this easily implies that unless P = NP no FPT algorithm can exist. There we will discuss how far toward
such algorithms one can seem to get within the ILPFP approach and its extensions, namely, by looking at the special
case of bounded weights and even of bounded weight-set-cardinality. That section notes that we can handle even the
coalitional case for bounded weights, and indeed even for unbounded weights but bounded manipulator-weight-set-
cardinality, and that latter case itself is a generalization of weighted noncoalitional manipulation.)
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elections, and see [28] for a survey of an alternate approach to bypassing complexity results).
5 Results by Looping over Frameworks
We now present our results that are established by our looping-over-frameworks idea. We will handle
in separate sections bribery, control, and manipulation, showing how to achieve FPT results for each.
In the bribery section, Section 5.1, we will first prove the bribery result for Schulze elections,
so that the reader quickly gets to seeing how the proof goes without having to have first seen how
the approach works for ranked pairs. We then will give our ranked pairs winner-set certification
framework, and will note how to convert our proof into a proof for that case also. Then later in
the control section, Section 5.2, we will state and prove together the Schulze-elections case and the
ranked-pairs case.
Since (unweighted) Schulze manipulation has been shown to be in P in general, both for the
constructive [15] and the destructive [27] cases, we do not need to handle Schulze elections in
our manipulation section, Section 5.3. (For the nonunique-winner model, weighted constructive
coalitional manipulation for Schulze elections, Gaspers et al. [15] provide what as mentioned earlier
is an FPT algorithm. And in Section 7 we will show, as part of Theorem 7.2, that for Schulze
elections our approach provides an FPT algorithm for special cases of both weighted destructive
coalitional manipulation and unique-winner model, weighted constructive coalitional manipulation.)
5.1 Bribery Results and Specification of Ranked Pairs Winner-Set Cer-
tification Framework
In this section, we will first state and prove the bribery result for Schulze, then will give our winner-
set certification framework for ranked pairs, and then will state and prove our bribery result for
ranked pairs.
5.1.1 Bribery Result for Schulze
We state and prove the bribery result for Schulze.
Theorem 5.1 For Schulze elections, bribery is in FPT (is fixed-parameter tractable) with respect to
the number of candidates, in both the succinct and nonsuccinct input models, for both constructive
and destructive bribery, in both the nonunique-winner model and the unique-winner model.
Proof. We first give the proof for the constructive, nonunique-winner model case. We will handle
simultaneously the succinct and nonsuccinct cases.
Our FPT algorithm works as follows. It gets as its input an instance of the bribery problem, and
so gets the candidates (with a distinguished candidate noted), the votes (or for the succinct version,
a list of which types of votes occur at least once, along with the multiplicities of each), and the
limit k on how many voters can be bribed. Let j be the number of candidates in the input instance.
To mesh with the naming scheme within our SWCFs, we immediately rename all the candidates
(including within the votes) to be 1, . . . , j, with the distinguished candidate becoming candidate 1.
Now, the top-level programming loop of the algorithm is as specified in Algorithm 1 (recall that we
are showing the constructive, nonunique-winner model case in this algorithm).
All that remains is to specify the ILPFPs that we build inside the loop, for each given j-SWCF
K. Suppose we are doing that for some particular K. We do it as follows.
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Algorithm 1 Top-level loop for bribery
Start
for each j-SWCF K do
if candidate 1 is a winner according toK andK is an internally consistent, well-formed j-SWCF
then
(1) build an ILPFP that checks whether there is a way of bribing at most k of the voters such
that K’s winner-set certification framework is realized by that bribe
(2) run that ILPFP and if it can be satisfied then halt and accept (note: the satisfying settings
will even let us output the precise bribe that succeeds)
end if
end for
declare that the given goal cannot be reached by using at most k bribes
End
There are j! possible votes over j candidates; let us number them from 1 through j! in any
natural computationally simple-to-handle way. We call the ith of these the ith “vote type.” We
will have constants ni, 1 ≤ i ≤ j!, denoting how many voters start with vote type ni. Our ILPFP
will have integer variables (which we will ensure are nonnegative) mi,ℓ, 1 ≤ i ≤ j!, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ j!.
mi,ℓ is the number of voters who start with vote type i but are bribed to instead cast vote type ℓ.
(Having mi,i 6= 0 is pointless but allowed, as is having simultaneously mi,ℓ > 0 and mℓ,i > 0.) So
the number of ILPFP variables is (j!)2, which is large but is bounded with respect to j, so Lenstra’s
algorithm [19] can be used to deliver an FPT performance overall.
Also, not as direct parts of the ILPFP but as tools to help us build it, we define two boolean predi-
cates, Bigger (a, b, c, d) and StrictlyBigger (a, b, c, d), where the arguments each vary over 1, . . . , j. Let
us use D(a, b) to indicate the weight of the WMG edge (after our manipulative actions) that points
from a to b. Recall, from Section 2, that what a j-SWCF does—and so in particular what our under-
consideration j-SWCF, K, does—is specify (for a very large number of such quadruples, though that
number actually is bounded as a function of j though we do not need that since our number of vari-
ables is already bounded as a function of j) that D(a, b) ≥ D(c, d) or that D(a, b) > D(c, d), i.e.,
that in the WMG, a certain edge is greater than or equal to another edge in weight, or is strictly
greater in weight. For each such specified relation that explicitly appears in K, set to true that bit
in the appropriate predicate (Bigger or StrictlyBigger ), and leave all the other bits set to false. We
of course will have to enforce these specifications through our constraints.
Now we can specify all the constraints of our ILPFP. There will be three types of constraints.
The first are the housekeeping constraints to make sure that the number of bribes and the mi,ℓs
are all reasonable. Our constraints of this sort are: For each 1 ≤ i, ℓ ≤ j!, we have a constraint
mi,ℓ ≥ 0. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ j! we have a constraint ni ≥
∑
1≤z≤j!mi,z; that is, we do not try to bribe
away from vote type i more votes than initially exist of vote type i. And we have the constraint
k ≥
∑
1≤i′,ℓ′≤j!mi′,ℓ′ ; that is, our total number of bribes does not exceed the bribe limit k.
The second type of constraint consists of those constraints used to enforce the bits set to “true”
in StrictlyBigger . For each such bit, we will generate one constraint: for a bit that is saying that
D(a, b) > D(c, d), we will enforce that with the constraint shown in Figure 2; in that figure and
for the rest of this paper, in order to make the representation of the constraints more concise, we
introduce the shorthand notation pref (a, b) as the set of vote types i, 1 ≤ i ≤ j!, in which candidate
a is preferred to candidate b. All that the bulky-looking constraint of the figure says is that after all
the gains and losses due to bribing happen, the number of voters who prefer a to b minus the number
who prefer b to a is strictly larger than the number of voters who prefer c to d minus the number
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( ∑
i∈pref (a,b)
(
ni −
( ∑
1≤ℓ′≤j!
mi,ℓ′
)
+
( ∑
1≤i′≤j!
mi′,i
)))
−
( ∑
i∈pref (b,a)
(
ni −
( ∑
1≤ℓ′≤j!
mi,ℓ′
)
+
( ∑
1≤i′≤j!
mi′,i
)))
≥ 1 +
( ∑
i∈pref (c,d)
(
ni −
( ∑
1≤ℓ′≤j!
mi,ℓ′
)
+
( ∑
1≤i′≤j!
mi′,i
)))
−
( ∑
i∈pref (d,c)
(
ni −
( ∑
1≤ℓ′≤j!
mi,ℓ′
)
+
( ∑
1≤i′≤j!
mi′,i
)))
.
Figure 2: Constraint enforcing that, after the bribes happen, D(a, b) > D(c, d).
who prefer d to c. If StrictlyBigger (a, b, c, d) is set to “false,” that does not mean we generate a
constraint ensuring that D(a, b) 6> D(c, d). Rather, if a given bit is set to “false,” that just means
that that particular bit-setting does not itself create a constraint. In contrast, bits set to “true” in
StrictlyBigger and Bigger mean that we generate a constraint to enforce the stated relation.
The third type of constraint consists of those constraints used to enforce the bits set to “true”
in Bigger . For each such bit, we will generate one constraint: for a bit that is saying that D(a, b) ≥
D(c, d), we will enforce that with precisely the constraint shown in Figure 2, except with the “1+”
removed from the right-hand side of the inequality.
That completes our statement of the ILPFP, which indeed captures what it seeks to capture.
And using Lenstra’s algorithm [19] for each of our ILPFPs, the overall loop over the ILPFPs has
the desired running time. (Although for each fixed j the multiplicative constant is very large, the
degree of the polynomial, which is uniform over all j, isn’t terrible; Lenstra’s algorithm uses just
a linear number of arithmetic operations on linear-sized integers [26]. Still, even within the good
news that we have placed the problem within FPT, there is the bad news that the multiplicative
constant is so large that this FPT algorithm does not provide an algorithm for practical use.) To be
clear, since what is a constant and what is a variable is a bit subtle here, let us say a bit more about
the use of Lenstra here. What we in effect are using is that Lenstra’s work ensures that there is a
k such that for each fixed number of candidates and each of the (large but bounded as a function
of the number of candidates) ILPFPs generated in our loop, if we view that ILPFP as an object
whose running time for solution is being evaluated asymptotically as the number of voters increases
without bound, the ILPFP’s running time is O(nk). (That same value k holds for all numbers of
candidates and for all ILPFPs that our loop generates for that number of candidates. However, for
different numbers of candidates the multiplicative constant represented by the “big O” may differ.)
Note that each such ILPFP object in effect has as its set of variables (regarding the asymptotics of
its running time) the constants of the ILPFP; and a big part of what our looping algorithm does is
to set those constants based on the votes in the election.
That was the proof for the constructive, nonunique-winner model case. To change the above
proof from the constructive to the destructive case and/or from the nonunique-winner case to the
unique-winner case, in the main loop we will simply create ILPFPs for only those SWCFs whose
set of who wins and loses reflects a sought outcome. For example, for the destructive case in the
unique-winner model, that would be having the distinguished candidate not be a unique winner, i.e.,
the start of Algorithm 1’s “if” statement would become “if candidate 1 is not a unique winner.” ❑
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The same proof approach applies to ranked pairs. However, we first must do some work to define
an appropriate winner-set certification framework for ranked pairs. We turn to that now.
5.1.2 Specification of Ranked Pairs Winner-Set Certification Framework
In this section, we describe the winner-set certification framework that makes our approach work
for ranked pairs.
Basically, an instance of that framework will be a story that tells us what happens at each stage
of the iterative process that defines ranked pairs. We could actually tell this story without fixing
up front, for each pair {a, b} of distinct candidates, whether a is preferred to b by a majority of the
voters, or whether b is preferred to a by a majority of the voters, or whether a and b exactly tie as
to how many voters prefer one to the other. Not fixing that information up front would improve our
multiplicative factor that depends on but is fixed for each fixed number of candidates. But we are
not focused on that factor. So to make things particularly simple to describe, we are here just going
to toss into our framework a fixing of all such pairwise-outcomes-in-the-WMG. As in the Schulze
case, we will have changed all the names of the candidates to be 1 through ‖C‖ (and will have
remapped our tie-breaking function in the same way). So, one part of our framework is, for each
(unordered) pair of distinct candidates {a, b}, a claim as to which one of these holds: the WMG edge
from a to b is strictly positive, the edge from b to a is strictly positive, or both edges are 0. (We do
not include any claim about the precise value of those edge weights; that would create a framework
whose number of instances, for a fixed number of candidates, grew with the number of voters—
something we must firmly avoid.) And an instance of the framework then goes step by step through
the process the ranked-pairs algorithm goes through, but in a somewhat ghostly way in terms of
what it specifies. For each step of the process, it makes a claim as to what pair of candidates is
considered next, and a claim as to whether that pair of candidates will be skipped permanently due
to it having been already set (due to transitivity) by earlier actions of our flow through ranked pairs
(that isn’t an on-the-fly thing in that the instance itself has all its earlier claims and so we can even
make sure to loop only over instances of the framework that are internally consistent regarding this),
and if it is not skipped, a claim about which of the two outcomes happens (which is placed above
the other in our ranked-pairs outcome; again, we can read this from those choice-of-3-possibilities
settings we did up front, plus the feasible tie-breaking if needed). So that is the story the framework
provides, and a given instance of the framework will (if properly formed) set an ordering over all
the candidates. As before, the algorithms will loop over instances of these frameworks, doing so
over only instances that have the desired outcome (e.g., “p is a unique winner”) and that aren’t
obviously internally inconsistent. (For our partition by voter cases, there is a double-loop over such
frameworks, to handle both subelections.)
As in the Schulze case, we will use the ILPFPs to see if the given kind of control can create a
case where the given framework can be made to hold. All the housekeeping work in the ILPFPs
as to tallying how the votes are bribed/controlled/manipulated is still needed here (so the variable
sets are the same as the ones for Schulze). But note, crucially, that we now must enforce not
things about paths, but rather we must enforce that the framework’s guesses about whether the
edge from a to b is negative, positive, or 0 after the bribery/control/manipulation are all correct
(this is very natural to enforce with constraints, within the ILPFP framing), and must also enforce
that the framework’s claim about which candidate pair is considered next is what would actually
happen under the votes that emerged from the bribery/control/manipulation. But that latter claim,
for each step in the story, can be checked by appropriate, carefully built constraints, written with
close attention paid to the tie-breaking rule among pairs. These constraints will be pretty much
our favorite sort of constraint—seeing whether a WMG edge is greater than or equal to another, or
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seeing whether it is strictly greater than another. This will be made clearest by an example. Suppose
our candidates are named 1, 2, 3, and 4. And suppose the tie-breaking order on unordered pairs
is {4, 3} > {4, 2} > {4, 1} > {3, 2} > {3, 1} > {2, 1}, and on candidates is 4 > 3 > 2 > 1. (This
is exactly a case of the sample feasible rule pair we gave in Section 3, where for example tied pairs
are tie-broken in favor of the pair with the lexicographically-larger larger-candidate-of-the-pair, and
when the larger members are the same in both pairs then the tie is broken in favor of whichever pair
has the lexicographically-larger smaller-candidate-of-the-pair. We’ve written our unordered pairs, in
the tie-breaking order above, with the lexicographically larger element first simply to make it clear
why Section 3’s example tie-breaking rule would put them in the order shown above.) Suppose the
RPWCF says the first pair to be compared is {1, 4} and that the outcome is 4 ≻ 1. Let D(a, b)
be defined as before. To check that 4 ≻ 1 is the right outcome, since 4 > 1 in the tie-breaking
function we need to check that D(4, 1) ≥ D(1, 4) (if 1 ≻ 4 in the tie-breaking order, we’d check
that D(4, 1) ≥ 1 + D(1, 4)); we can read this right off the 3-way-claim as to how 1 and 4 compare
in their head-to-head contest, which itself we’ll enforce in constraints. And as to the claim that
(1, 4) was the first pair to be compared, in light of the tie-breaking order, that can be enforced
using 10 constraints: 6 saying that our pair ties or beats those below us in the tie-breaking ordering
(D(4, 1) ≥ D(a, b) for the (a, b) values (3, 2), (2, 3), (3, 1), (1, 3), (2, 1), (1, 2)), and 4 saying that
our pair strictly beats those above us in the tie-breaking ordering (D(4, 1) ≥ D(a, b) for the (a, b)
values (4, 3), (3, 4), (4, 2), (2, 4)). We could cut those 6 + 4 constraints to 3 + 2 if we wish, by using
the value of the 3-way-claim for each of those 5 other pairs. Note that all these comparisons are
about post-bribe/manipulation/control vote numbers—things we do know how to easily put into an
ILPFP constraint, basically, by appropriate summations. Moving on, if the framework says the next
unordered pair after {1, 4} to be considered is {1, 3} and that the outcome is 1 ≻ 3, we of course
will not need to enforce any comparisons with D(4, 1) or D(1, 4); we will generate and put into the
ILPFP just the needed/appropriate comparisons. If the framework after that says the third pair
to consider is {3, 4} but it also says that (due to 4 ≻ 1 ≻ 3 already being set) the pair {3, 4} gets
skipped, we under our RPWCF framework still must generate the constraints to check that {3, 4}
truly under our votes as they now are did deserve to come up next (we mention in passing that we
could skip that check as long as we adjust our ILPFP to not check anything regarding pairs that
are already related, even transitively, under the ≻’s so far—a slightly different approach than ours
but also quite fine), but the generated comparisons-to-check-that will not do comparisons against
things the existing order so far (4 ≻ 1 ≻ 3) takes out of play. This completes our description of our
RPWCF notion.
5.1.3 Bribery Result for Ranked Pairs
Having specified the ranked pairs winner-set certification framework, the bribery case for ranked
pairs can now be stated and justified.
Theorem 5.2 For ranked pairs (with any feasible tie-breaking functions), bribery is in FPT (is fixed-
parameter tractable) with respect to the number of candidates, in both the succinct and nonsuccinct
input models, for both constructive and destructive bribery, in both the nonunique-winner model and
the unique-winner model.
Proof. We use the programming loop of Algorithm 1 to now loop over not j-SWCFs, but instead
over j-RPWCFs, with j again being the number of candidates. The variables of the ILPFPs will be
the same as those for Schulze. As for the constraints of the ILPFPs, all the housekeeping constraints
for bribery remain intact. Additionally an RPWCF, as described in Section 5.1.2, guesses for each
edge whether it is positive, negative, or zero in weight. We can easily handle these possibilities
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with the constraints D(a, b) ≥ 1, D(b, a) ≥ 1, and D(a, b) = 0 respectively. The other constraints
enforced by an RPWCF are those between pairs of edges, and they can be successfully captured by
the StrictlyBigger and Bigger predicates defined in the proof of Theorem 5.1. Thus we clearly can
build an ILPFP encoding an RPWCF and the constraints of the bribery problem in the same way
we did for Schulze elections, and bribery is in FPT for ranked pairs as well. ❑
5.2 Control Results
In this section, we prove our results for control gained through the looping-over-frameworks approach.
Our proofs for these cases will closely follow our general looping-over-frameworks structure, and we
will just have to appropriately build the constraints of our ILPFPs to handle the details of the
control problems.
Theorem 5.3 For Schulze elections and for (with any feasible tie-breaking functions) ranked pairs,
control by adding voters is in FPT with respect to the number of candidates, in both the succinct and
nonsuccinct input models, for both constructive and destructive control, and in both the nonunique-
winner model and the unique-winner model.
Proof. We will handle together all the cases of this theorem.
Again, let the candidates in the control problem be 1, . . . , j with the distinguished candidate
being 1. The control problem has as its input a set of initial votes V and a set of additional votes
W (or for the succinct version, one list for each of these two sets describing which types of votes
occur at least once in that set, along with the multiplicities of each), the latter of which contains
the votes that can be added by the control action. Also there is a limit k on the number of votes
that can be added from W .
The top-level programming loop is as described in Algorithm 2 (with WCF being either SWCF
for Schulze or RPWCF for ranked pairs).
Algorithm 2 Top-level loop for control by adding voters
Start
for each j-WCF K do
if candidate 1 (is/is not) (a winner/a unique winner) according to K and K is an internally
consistent, well-formed j-WCF then
(1) build an ILPFP that checks whether there is a set of votesW ′ ⊆W , with ‖W ′‖ ≤ k, such
that K’s winner-set certification framework is realized by the set of votes V ∪W ′
(2) run that ILPFP and if it can be satisfied then halt and accept (note: the satisfying settings
will even let us output the precise added set that succeeds)
end if
end for
declare that the given goal cannot be reached by adding at most k voters
End
The two binary selections in the algorithm’s “if” statement are made as in the proof of
Theorem 5.6.
All we have to do now is show how we build the ILPFP inside the loop. Again, as with manipu-
lation, we will have two groups of constraints: those corresponding to the WCF-enforcing predicates
and those corresponding to the structure of the control problem. For every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ j!, we will have
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a variable vi representing the number of votes of type i in W
′ (i.e., the W ′ sought by Algorithm 2),
a constant ni representing the number of votes of type i in V , and a constant hi representing the
number of votes of type i in W .
As we described in the proof of Theorem 5.6, if we can represent D(a, b) as a linear expression
in terms of our constants and variables, we can implement all the WCF-enforcing constraints (those
of the StrictlyBigger and Bigger predicates and those of the 3-way possibilities for ranked pairs)
as linear constraints in our ILPFP. Thus, using the shorthand notation pref (a, b) as described in
Section 5.3, we express D(a, b) as follows:∑
i∈pref (a,b)
(ni + vi) −
∑
i′∈pref (b,a)
(ni′ + vi′).
As for the constraints ensuring the validity of the control action, we first need to ensure that for
every type of vote, the number of votes of that type in W ′ is bounded by the number in W . For
every vote type i, 1 ≤ i ≤ j!, the constraint vi ≤ hi will enforce this in our ILPFP. We also make
the following constraint to enforce the adding bound:∑
1≤i≤j!
vi ≤ k. (5.1)
Here again all of our variables have to be nonnegative, and thus we have the constraint vi ≥ 0 for
every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ j!.
This suffices to describe how we can build a WCF-enforcing ILPFP for the control by adding
voters problem in a way appropriate for our looping-over-frameworks technique. Thus we have an
algorithm that will run in uniform polynomial time for every fixed parameter value, putting this
problem in FPT. ❑
Theorem 5.4 For Schulze elections and for (with any feasible tie-breaking functions) ranked pairs,
control by deleting voters is in FPT with respect to the number of candidates, in both the succinct and
nonsuccinct input models, for both constructive and destructive control, and in both the nonunique-
winner model and the unique-winner model.
Proof. We will handle together all the cases of this theorem.
The input for this problem is a control instance with a set of votes V over j candidates 1, . . . , j,
with candidate 1 being the distinguished candidate, and with a bound k on the number of votes to
be deleted. Algorithm 3 specifies the top-level loop.
The two binary selections in the algorithm’s “if” statement are made as in the proof of
Theorem 5.6.
For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ j!, the ILPFP we build inside the loop will include a constant ni, representing
how many votes of vote type i are in the initial election. We will include in the ILPFP variables vi,
1 ≤ i ≤ j!, representing the number of votes of type i that are deleted. With this new variable, we
will formulate D(a, b) in the ILPFP as follows:∑
i∈pref (a,b)
(ni − vi) −
∑
i′∈pref (b,a)
(ni′ − vi′).
With this we can easily build the Bigger and StrictlyBigger predicates we use to enforce the
WCF, as well as the additional constraints necessary for an RPWCF.
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Algorithm 3 Top-level loop for control by deleting voters
Start
for each j-WCF K do
if candidate 1 (is/is not) (a winner/a unique winner) according to K and K is an internally
consistent, well-formed j-WCF then
(1) build an ILPFP that checks whether there is a subset of the voters V ′, with ‖V ′‖ ≤ k,
such that K’s winner-set certification framework is realized by the set of votes V − V ′
(2) run that ILPFP and if it can be satisfied then halt and accept (note: the satisfying settings
will even let us output the precise deleted set that succeeds)
end if
end for
declare that the given goal cannot be reached by deleting at most k voters
End
Additionally, we need to include constraints that ensure that the control action chosen through
the assignment to the variables is a legal one. We include a constraint vi ≥ 0 for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ j!,
enforcing that we cannot delete a negative number of voters of any type. We include constraints
ni ≥ vi for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ j!, enforcing that we cannot delete more voters of any type than there
were in the first place. And finally we add a constraint k ≥
∑
1≤i≤j! vi, bounding the total number
of deletions by the bound k.
The above modifications to our basic approach embed the problem of deciding what subset of
voters to delete to satisfy a given WCF into an ILPFP, and there will be only a constant number
of ILPFPs to test for each number of candidates. Thus the algorithm specified by the outer loop
above is uniformly polynomial for every fixed parameter value, putting this problem in FPT. ❑
Theorem 5.5 For Schulze elections and for (with any feasible tie-breaking functions) ranked pairs,
control by partition of voters is in FPT with respect to the number of candidates, in both the ties-
eliminate and ties-promote models, in both the succinct and nonsuccinct input models, for both
constructive and destructive control, and in both the nonunique-winner model and the unique-winner
model.
Proof. We will handle together all the cases of this theorem.
The cases of this theorem can again be handled with our looping-over-frameworks approach, and
the constraints and modifications necessary to properly implement the WCF-enforcing ILPFP are
similar to the previous cases, though we have to loop over not just single WCFs but rather pairs of
them, one for each part of the partition. As before we will assume the candidate names are 1, . . . , j
with 1 as the distinguished candidate. We specify the outer loop for these cases in Algorithm 4.
The two binary selections in the algorithm’s step (2) are made analogously to the decision in the
“if” line within the proof of Theorem 5.6.
Now we must specify the new details of the partition-handling ILPFPs. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ j!,
we will include a constant ni representing how many votes of vote type i are in the initial election
and a variable vi representing how many votes of type i are put into V1 (i.e., the V1 sought by
Algorithm 4).
Though we must use two WCFs, we can implement each as before, and the constraints for each
of a given pair of WCFs will appear together as part of a single ILPFP. Let us use the predicates
Bigger 1 and StrictlyBigger 1 (Bigger 2 and StrictlyBigger 2) to handle the constraints of WCF K1
(K2) over the weights of its WMG edges, which we will denote by D1 (D2).
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Algorithm 4 Top-level loop for control by partition of voters
Start
for each j-WCF K1 do
for each j-WCF K2 do
if K1 and K2 are internally consistent, well-formed j-WCFs then
(1) build an ILPFP that checks whether there is a partition of the voters V into V1, V2,
such that K1’s winner-set certification framework is realized by the set of votes V1 and K2’s
winner-set certification framework is realized by the set of votes V2
(2) run that ILPFP and if it can be satisfied, and if candidate 1 (is/is not) (a winner/a
unique winner) in the election with voters V and the surviving candidates from K1 and
K2 (according to the tie-handling rule in use, namely ties-eliminate or ties-promote), halt
and accept (note: the satisfying settings will even let us output the precise partition that
succeeds)
end if
end for
end for
declare that the given goal cannot be reached by any partition of voters
End
Bigger 1 and StrictlyBigger 1 can be formulated appropriately in terms of D1, while Bigger 2 and
StrictlyBigger 2 can be formulated in terms of D2. The extra constraints for ranked pairs will be
implemented in terms of D1 and D2 as appropriate, as well. We will now show how to handle D1 and
D2. D1(a, b) denotes how many voters in V1 prefer candidate a to candidate b and we can formulate
it as follows: ∑
i∈pref (a,b)
vi −
∑
i∈pref (b,a)
vi.
D2(a, b) denotes how many voters in V2 prefer a to b, and we formulate it as follows:∑
i∈pref (a,b)
(ni − vi) −
∑
i∈pref (b,a)
(ni − vi).
Finally, we must add constraints to ensure the chosen partition is a legal one. We include a
constraint vi ≥ 0 for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ j!, enforcing that a nonnegative number of voters of each type
are chosen for the first partition. We include a constraint ni ≥ vi for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ j!, enforcing
that we do not take more voters than exist of each type for the first partition.
The above modifications to our basic approach embed the problem of deciding what partition of
voters to use to satisfy a pair of WCFs into an ILPFP, and there will be only a constant number
of ILPFPs to test for each number of candidates. Thus the algorithm specified by the outer loop
above is uniformly polynomial for every fixed parameter value, putting this problem in FPT. ❑
5.3 Manipulation Results
Unweighted manipulation in Schulze elections has recently been shown to be in P by Gaspers et
al. [15] for the constructive case. So, since the destructive case was itself handled even earlier by
Parkes and Xia [27], there is no need to cover (unweighted) manipulation for Schulze elections in
this paper.
18
We now present our FPT result for (unweighted) manipulation in ranked pairs elections. Al-
though for this case we could use the looping-over-framework approach to obtain an FPT algorithm,
we instead obtain an FPT algorithm here simply as a consequence of Theorem 5.3.
Very loosely put, the idea behind this proof is that, in a certain sense, for fixed numbers of
candidates manipulation nicely reduces—not just regarding ranked pairs but in fact as a general
matter—to control by adding voters, simply by putting into the set of potential voters to add
enough copies of every possible vote. Unfortunately, this approach doesn’t quite work, due to
the standard definition of control by adding candidates bounding rather than exactly setting the
number of additions, which is what one needs as one’s reduction’s target to make this connection
work. However, this worry is easy enough to smooth over that we still can prove the manipulation
case here as a quick consequence of groundwork done for control.
Theorem 5.6 For ranked pairs (with any feasible tie-breaking functions), manipulation is in FPT
with respect to the number of candidates, in both the succinct and nonsuccinct input models, for
both constructive and destructive manipulation, and in both the nonunique-winner model and the
unique-winner model.
Proof. We will handle together all the cases of this theorem. Let us again assume without loss
of generality that the candidates in the manipulation problem are 1, . . . , j with the distinguished
candidate being 1. The manipulation problem has as its input a set of nonmanipulative votes V (or
for the succinct version, a list of which types of votes occur at least once, along with the multiplicities
of each) and the set of manipulators W .
We give an fpt-reduction—for readers not familiar with their definition, it can be found near the
start of Section 6.4—from this problem to a slightly modified version of control by adding voters.
The difference is that instead of having a bound on the number of votes which we can add, we will
need an exact number of votes to be added. This modification will change only one of the constraints
in our ILPFP (the constraint labeled 5.1 in the proof of Theorem 5.3) from being an inequality to
an equality, and so it is clear that the thus-altered control by adding voters problems remain in FPT
(by the thus-altered version of Theorem 5.3 and its proof). So an fpt-reduction to that problem will
establish our desired FPT result for manipulation.
Our (modified) control instance will have the same set of candidates, and the same distinguished
candidate. The set of initial votes in the control instance will be identical to the set of nonmanip-
ulative votes in the manipulation instance. As for the additional vote set in the control instance,
it will include ‖W‖ copies of each possible vote (out of all j! votes) (or for the succinct version, a
list of all j! vote types, each with multiplicity of ‖W‖). Finally, the “exact” number of votes to be
added is equal to ‖W‖. This completes the specification of the reduction.
Clearly, a manipulation instance is a Yes instance of manipulation if and only if this construction
map to a Yes instance of the modified control problem. Furthermore, the mapped-to control instance
will have the same number of candidates as the mapped-from manipulation instance. Finally, the
reduction runs in time |x|(j!), where |x| is the manipulation problem’s input size. Thus the reduction
meets the requirement of an fpt-reduction. This proves that manipulation is in FPT with respect
to the number of candidates. ❑
6 Other Results for the Unweighted Case
Section 7 will discuss the weighted case, but we first present some additional results regarding the
unweighted case.
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6.1 Candidate Control Parameterized on the Number of Candidates
Under our primary parameterization of interest, parameterizing on the number of candidates, and
when considering manipulation, bribery, and voter control, we achieved FPT results using the
looping-over-frameworks technique, and thus involving Lenstra’s algorithm. In contrast, when con-
sidering candidate control problems parameterized on the number of candidates, we need not use
such a powerful technique. Instead it is sufficient to brute-force search over all possible control
solutions to see if any of them are successful. At every possible value for the parameter, there are
only a constant number of possible solutions to any of the candidate control problems, and checking
the success of the possible solution will require only a simple polynomial-time task. Thus we have
algorithms that at each fixed parameter value will have a running time that is a (large, parameter-
value-dependent) constant times a small uniform polynomial. This puts these problems in FPT. We
mention that for the adding/unlimited adding of candidates cases, the parameter can even be taken
to just be the size of the pool of potential additional candidates, regardless of how many original
candidates there were.
Theorem 6.1 For Schulze elections and for (with any feasible tie-breaking functions) ranked pairs,
control is in FPT with respect to the number of candidates, in both the succinct and nonsuccinct
input models, for both constructive and destructive control, for all standard types of candidate control
(adding/unlimited adding/deleting candidates and, in both the ties-eliminate and ties-promote first-
round promotion models, partition and runoff partition of candidates), in both the nonunique-winner
model and the unique-winner model.
Proof. In the case of adding candidates, at most all the 2||D|| possible subsets of the auxiliary
candidate set D need be considered. In the case of deleting candidates, at most all subsets of C that
contain the distinguished candidate p need be considered, and so we need look at at most 2||C||−1
subsets. (In the destructive case, the definition of this control type forbids trivially satisfying the
goal by deleting p. In the constructive case, deleting p would make success impossible and so it need
not be considered.) In the case of runoff partition, there are 2||C||−1 interestingly distinct partitions,
while in the partition case there are 2||C||. The difference between these two different types of
partition cases is because in runoff partition of candidates case the two parts of the partition are
handled symmetrically, and so the partitions (A,B) and (B,A) are not interestingly distinct from
each other, and we need consider just one among them. However, in the partition of candidates
case, where one side of the partition is getting a bye, no such general symmetry can be claimed. For
each of these cases, for each setting of its item that we are cycling through above, we have to call
the voting system’s winner problem between one and three times. So all these cases will be in FPT
for any voting system with a polynomial-time winner problem. ❑
6.2 Voter Control Parameterized on the Number of Voters
Although we feel that the number of candidates is the most natural parameterization for manip-
ulative action problems, it is natural to ask about parameterizing on the number of voters. We
do not exhaustively handle this case for all manipulative action problems, but we note that voter
control problems parameterized on the number of voters can be shown to be in FPT through simple
brute-force. Again, as in the case of candidate control problems parameterized on the number of
candidates, we note that the number of possible solutions to these problems is bounded by a constant
for each parameter value, and checking each solution is easily done in polynomial time, giving us
an FPT algorithm for each of the voter control problems. We mention that for the adding of voters
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cases, the parameter can even be taken to just be the size of the pool of potential additional voters,
regardless of how many original voters there were.
Theorem 6.2 For Schulze elections and for (with any feasible tie-breaking functions) ranked pairs,
control is in FPT with respect to the number of voters, in both the succinct and nonsuccinct in-
put models, for both constructive and destructive control, for all standard types of voter control
(adding/deleting voters and, in both the ties-eliminate and ties-promote first-round promotion mod-
els, partition of voters), in both the nonunique-winner model and the unique-winner model.
Proof. In the case of adding voters we will have to try at most all of the 2||W || possible subsets of
the auxiliary voter set W . In the case of deleting voters we will have to consider at most all the
2||V || subsets of the voter set V . And in the partition of voters cases we will have to consider the
2||V ||−1 interestingly distinct partitions of the voter set (again, we need consider just one among the
partitions (A,B) and (B,A)). In all of these cases the large exponential term of the complexity will
be constant with fixed parameter values. And beyond that term, we will just have to perform a few
iterations of the voting system’s winner function along with a few other simple checks, putting all
these cases in FPT for any voting system with a polynomial-time winner problem. ❑
6.3 WMG Edge Bound Parameterization
Let us return to considering the case of parameterization by number of candidates. What drove us
to our approach of looping over the winner “frameworks” we defined, rather than just looping over
all WMGs? It was the fact that even for fixed numbers of candidates, the number of WMGs blows
up as the number of voters increases. We mention in passing, though, that if one, in addition to
parameterizing on the number of candidates, requires that the absolute value of the edge weights in
the WMG be bounded by some fixed constant independent of the number of voters, then for that
particular special case, one could loop over all WMGs. Is this natural and important? We would
tend to say “no,” because assuming that all edges in the WMG have weights bounded by k is to
assume that even as the number of voters grows, every single head-on-head contest between pairs of
candidates is very evenly matched. That simply is not the case in most natural elections.
On the other hand, perhaps surprisingly, there is something theoretical to be gained from the
strange approach just mentioned of considering elections in which all edges of the WMG turn out to
have relatively low weights. In particular, we observe that in the NP-hardness-establishing reductions
to Schulze control problems used by Menton and Singh [24], all edges in the WMG have absolute
value at most 6 (and for some types of control, at most 4 or 2). That, along with that fact that all
weights of edges in the WMG have the same parity, gives us Corollaries 6.3 and 6.4.
Corollary 6.3 (Corollary to the proofs of Menton and Singh [25]) Even when restricted to in-
stances having all pairwise contests so equal that each WMG edge5 has absolute value at most 2,
Schulze elections are NP-complete (in the nonunique-winner model) for constructive control by delet-
ing candidates. The same holds for constructive control by adding candidates, unlimited adding of
candidates, partition of candidates in the ties-eliminate model, and runoff partition of candidates in
5In Corollaries 6.3 and 6.4, when we speak of restricting a WMG, the WMG we are speaking of as having to obey
the restriction is the WMG involving all candidates involved in the problem. So for adding candidates, the WMG this
is speaking of is, using the votes in the problem instance, the WMG whose nodes are all the initial candidates and all
the candidates in the pool of candidates that can potentially be added. Since membership in NP for all the problems
discussed is obvious, what is most interesting in this theorem is NP-hardness. And the fact that our restriction is
applying to the broadest WMG involved in these control-by-candidates problems makes the restriction harsher than
if it were applying to some sub-WMG, and so makes the results stronger.
21
the ties-eliminate model, except with a bound of 4. The same holds for constructive control by par-
tition of candidates in the ties-promote model and runoff partition of candidates in the ties-promote
model, except with a bound of 6.
Clearly, this immediately implies the following result (still keeping in mind that the values of all
edge weights are of the same parity).
Corollary 6.4 (Corollary to the proofs of Menton and Singh [25]) Even when restricted to in-
stances having all pairwise contests so equal that the total cardinality of the set of absolute values of
WMG edges (in the WMG involving all candidates in the instance) is at most 2, Schulze elections are
NP-complete (in the nonunique-winner model) for constructive control by deleting candidates. Even
when restricted to instances having all pairwise contests so equal that the total cardinality of the set
of values of WMG edges is at most 3, Schulze elections are NP-complete (in the nonunique-winner
model) for constructive control by deleting candidates. The same claims hold for constructive control
by adding candidates, unlimited adding of candidates, partition of candidates in the ties-eliminate
model, and runoff partition of candidates in the ties-eliminate model, except with the 2 and 3 above
replaced by 3 and 5. The same holds for constructive control by partition of candidates in the ties-
promote model and runoff partition of candidates in the ties-promote model, except with the 2 and
3 above replaced by 4 and 7.
6.4 Adding/Deleting Bound Parameterization
For those control problems having as part of their inputs a limit on how many candidates or voters
can be added/deleted, it is natural to consider parameterizing on that limit. This parameterization
has been studied in some voting systems and the relevant problems have often been found to be
W[1]-hard or W[2]-hard, and thus very unlikely to be fixed-parameter tractable. For example, under
this parameterization, Betzler and Uhlmann [5] showed, for what are known as Copelandα elections,
that constructive control by adding candidates and constructive control by deleting candidates are
W[2]-complete, Liu and Zhu [21] proved, for maximin elections, that constructive control by adding
candidates is W[2]-hard, and Liu and Zhu also achieved W[1]-hardness results for the relevant
voter control problems. For additional control results parameterized on the problem’s internal
addition/deletion limit, see Table 8 of Betzler et al. [4].
Hardness for these classes is defined in terms of fpt-reductions (by which we will always mean
many-one fpt-reductions). Thus one typically shows a problem is, for instance, W[2]-hard by pro-
viding such a reduction from a known W[2]-hard problem. We now give the standard definition of
fpt-reductions for the case of reductions from a problem, call it Q, with respect to a parameter j
(let j(x) be the function that given an input to Q gives the value of that parameter on input x), to
a problem, call it Q′, with respect to a parameter j′ (let j′(x) be the function that given an input
to Q′ gives the value of that parameter on input x). A function R is an fpt-reduction from Q to Q′
if the following three conditions hold [13]: (i) For each x, x ∈ Q if and only if R(x) ∈ Q′. (ii) There
exist a polynomial p and a computable function f such that R is computable in time f(j(x))p(|x|).
(iii) There exists a computable function g such that, for all x, j′(R(x)) ≤ g(j(x)).
We observe that, with respect to parameterizing on the internal addition/deletion bound, for
Schulze elections it holds that constructive control by adding voters, constructive control by deleting
voters, and constructive control by adding candidates are all W[2]-hard.
Theorem 6.5 Parameterized on the adding bound, each of
1. constructive control by adding voters,
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2. constructive control by deleting voters, and
3. constructive control by adding candidates
is W[2]-hard for Schulze elections, in the nonunique-winner model.
These problems have already been shown to be NP-complete by Parkes and Xia [27] and Menton and
Singh [23] through reductions from exact cover by 3-sets (X3C). In order to prove W[2]-hardness,
we need to reduce from a parameterized problem that is known to be W[2]-hard. One such problem
is hitting set. Thus we modify the NP-hardness proofs given by Parkes and Xia to reduce from
hitting set instead of from X3C. All that is necessary is to replace the role of candidates modeling
X3C elements with the role of candidates modeling hitting set sets, and to replace the role of
voters modeling the X3C sets with the role of voters with the same preferences modeling hitting set
elements. For the sake of completeness, we give the complete reduction for one of the above three
cases, namely, control by adding candidates. First, we give the definition of hitting set.
Definition 6.6 (Hitting Set) Given a set of elements U , a collection F of subsets of U , and a
positive integer k, does there exist H ⊆ U , with ‖H‖ ≤ k, such that for every S ∈ F , we have
S ∩H 6= ∅ (i.e., H hits every set in F)?
Proof of part 3 of Theorem 6.5. The standard NP-complete problem hitting set is also known to
be W[2]-complete (see p. 464 of [8]). We give an fpt-reduction from hitting set to our problem.
Given a hitting set instance (U,F , k) as described in the definition, we will construct a control
instance (C,D, V, p, k) where C is a set of original candidates, D is a set of auxiliary candidates, V
is a set of voters, p is a distinguished candidate, and k is an adding bound. The original candidate
set C will contain the following candidates.
• The distinguished candidate p.
• A candidate S for every S ∈ F .
The auxiliary candidate set D will contain the following:
• A candidate u for every u ∈ U .
The voter set V will be as follows. We will not explicitly construct the entire voter set, but
rather we will specify the weight of the WMG edges between the candidates and let the voter set be
as constructed by McGarvey’s method [22]. For readers not familiar with McGarvey’s method, and
especially since in the proof of Theorem 7.3 we use McGarvey’s method in a weighted-voting setting,
and the method’s mechanics are very slightly different in such a setting, we provide as Appendix B a
self-contained presentation of McGarvey’s method for both the unweighted and the weighted cases.
• For every S ∈ F , D(S, p) = 2 (and so D(p, S) = −2).
• For every u ∈ U , D(p, u) = 2 (and so D(u, p) = −2).
• For every u ∈ U , and for every S ∈ F such that u ∈ S, D(u, S) = 2 (and so D(S, u) = −2).
• All WMG edges not set above will be of weight 0.
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The distinguished candidate will be p and the adding limit will be the same limit k as in the
hitting set instance. This completes the specification of the reduction. Note that initially—i.e.,
before any adding of candidates—the winners are exactly the “S” candidates (unless F = ∅, in
which case p is initially a winner in the control problem, and the hitting set instance is a positive
instance, so in the case we are already done).
If we map from a positive hitting set instance, we claim that we will have a positive instance of
the control problem. Why? Let H ⊆ U , ‖H‖ ≤ k, be a solution to the hitting set instance. We
will show that the set of candidates D′ corresponding to the elements from H will be a solution to
the control instance. First, ‖D′‖ ≤ k, so we are within the adding bound. Also, since the hitting
set solution includes members of every set in F , there will be a path of strength two from p to each
candidate corresponding to those sets, as including a candidate u ∈ U creates paths from p to every
“S” candidate hit by u. It is easy to see that p will have paths to every other candidate just as
strong as they have back to p, and so p will be a Schulze winner.
If our reduction maps to a successful control instance, we claim it must have mapped from a
positive hitting set instance. Why? Recall that we earlier handled the case ‖F‖ = 0. Initially, each
“S” candidate will have a path of strength two to p, but p’s strongest path to each of them is of
strength negative two. Adding “u” candidates will leave those strength-two paths from each “S”
candidate to p intact. Since all edges have weight at most two, regardless of how many candidates
we add, no path can have a strength of more than two. So for a control instance to succeed it must
give p a strength-two path to each “S” candidate. In our setting, that means adding a set of k “u”
(auxiliary) candidates such that each “S” candidate is pointed to (with a weight-two edge) by at
least one of them. However, given our current setup, that itself says that the hitting set instance
being mapped from is a positive instance.
Note also that our reduction clearly runs in polynomial time in the size of the entire input, easily
meeting the running-time limit for an fpt-reduction. Additionally, the parameter in the mapped-
to instance will always be bounded by—in fact, identical to—the parameter in the mapped-from
instance.
So this clearly is an fpt-reduction from hitting set to our problem. Thus we have established
that constructive control by adding candidates, parameterized on the adding bound, is W[2]-hard
for Schulze elections, in the nonunique-winner model. ❑
7 Weighted Case
Finally, although in this paper we have focused on manipulation problems without weights, and on
bribery problems without weights or prices, we mention in passing that (keep in mind we still are
also parameterizing on the number of candidates, and that when weights and prices are used in
problems, they are typically taken to be—and here we do take them to be—nonnegative integers)
if one parameterizes by also bounding the maximum voter weight (if there are weights) and the
maximum voter price (if there are prices), our main theorems hold even in the context of weights
and prices. That is because when weights and prices are bounded, one can clearly still carry out the
approach we use.
In fact, we can go slightly further, although at the outer edge of things doing so will require
some surgery on our approach. Not just for the cases of bounded weights and prices, but even for
the case where there is a bound on the cardinality of the set of weights (if there are weights) and
there is a bound on the cardinality of the set of prices (if there are prices), all theorems (again, still
parameterizing also on number of candidates) of Section 5 in bribery and manipulation still hold (as
24
also do our Section 5 theorems on control, if one looks at control in the context of weighted votes;
studying control in the context of weighted votes has only very recently been generally proposed [11],
see also [29,20]). To give an example of how we can handle this, we now state and prove in detail
the case of bribery (We note that both Theorem 5.1 and 5.2 follow from Theorem 7.1, which is not
surprising as Theorem 7.1 in fact is building on and generalizing their approach. We included those
earlier proofs because they provide a clearer, simpler setting in which to present our proofs, and
they prepare us for the proof of the present more flexible case.)
Theorem 7.1 For Schulze elections and for (with any feasible tie-breaking functions) ranked pairs,
weighted bribery, priced bribery, and weighted, priced bribery each are in FPT with respect to the
combined parameter “number of candidates” and “cardinality of the set of voter weights” (for cases
with weights) and “cardinality of the set of voter prices” (for cases with prices), in both the suc-
cinct and nonsuccinct input models, for both constructive and destructive bribery, and in both the
nonunique-winner model and the unique-winner model.
Proof. We will describe how to handle the weighted, priced case. This is a generalization of both
the weighted, unpriced case and the unweighted, priced case. So our algorithm will also handle
both those cases. The top-level loop will be as in the standard bribery proof in Section 5.1. We
will specify the extensions to the ILPFP construction that are necessary to handle the weights and
prices.
Let 1, . . . , j be the candidates, let w = {w1, . . . , wy} be the set of weights of the voters, and
let p = {p1, . . . , pz} be the set of prices. We will have a constant n
α,β
i denoting how many voters
there are of type i with weight wα and with price pβ for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ j!, α, 1 ≤ α ≤ y, and β,
1 ≤ β ≤ z. We will have a variable mα,βi,ℓ , for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ j!, ℓ, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ j!, α, 1 ≤ α ≤ y, and
β, 1 ≤ β ≤ z. mα,βi,ℓ describes the number of voters with weight wα and price pβ that are bribed
from vote type i to vote type ℓ. Our total number of variables is larger than in the unweighted
unpriced case, but it is still bounded as a function of only j, y, and z, which make up our combined
parameter.
Now we will describe how to build the constraints in our ILPFP. As before, we can implement
the predicates Bigger and StrictlyBigger—and for ranked pairs the additional constraints to handle
ranked pairs—in terms of D(a, b), the weight of the edge from a to b in the WMG. So we need only
specify how to formulate D(a, b) and how to formulate appropriate housekeeping constraints. As to
D(a, b), we need to take into account both voters that are bribed away from preferring a over b and
voters that are bribed into preferring a over b. And we need to keep track of voters of every type,
weight, and price. Still, what we need is very much in line with our simpler implementation of this
function in the standard bribery case. So our new formulation of D(a, b) will to capture it with the
following expression:
∑
1≤α≤y
∑
1≤β≤z
∑
i∈pref(a,b)
wα

nα,βi − ∑
1≤ℓ≤j!, ℓ 6=i
(
m
α,β
i,ℓ
)
+
∑
1≤ℓ≤j!, ℓ 6=i
(
m
α,β
ℓ,i
)
−
∑
1≤α≤y
∑
1≤β≤z
∑
i∈pref(b,a)
wα

nα,βi − ∑
1≤ℓ≤j!, ℓ 6=i
(
m
α,β
i,ℓ
)
+
∑
1≤ℓ≤j!, ℓ 6=i
(
m
α,β
ℓ,i
) .
We have not excluded the unneeded and rather unhelpful casemα,βi,i 6= 0. Also, the four “ℓ 6=i”s above
could be dropped as they cancel each other. However, we include them as they are the natural way
to express what is being modeled.
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Additionally we need to implement constraints to make sure that the bribery action we select
is a legal one. Thus, besides the natural constraints mα,βi,ℓ ≥ 0, ensuring that we do not bribe a
negative number of voters of a certain type, we have to enforce that we do not bribe more voters
than exist of every type. Thus for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ j!, α, 1 ≤ α ≤ y, and β, 1 ≤ β ≤ z, we have the
following constraint:
n
α,β
i ≥
∑
1≤ℓ≤j!
m
α,β
i,ℓ .
And also we must restrict the total cost of all our bribes to the bribe-cost limit k. Thus we have
the following constraint:
k ≥
∑
1≤α≤y
∑
1≤β≤z
∑
1≤i≤j!
∑
1≤ℓ≤j!
pβm
α,β
i,ℓ .
These additional constraints will enforce a legal selection of voters to bribe. These, together
with our specification of D(a, b), complete the specification of the WCF-enforcing ILPFP. Overall
we have a structure that will have a constant number of constraints in terms of the parameters, and
that will have a solution if and only if there is a successful bribery action. Also there will be only
a constant number of WCFs for every fixed set of parameter values; in fact it will be constant in
terms of just the number of candidates, and there will be no more WCFs than in the unweighted,
unpriced case.
Thus we have established that the weighted variant, the priced variant, and the weighted, priced
variant of bribery are each in FPT when parameterized on the combined parameter “number of
candidates” and “cardinality of the set of voter weights” (if there are weights) and “cardinality of
the set of voter prices” (if there are prices). ❑
Pushing beyond this, for the case of manipulation (still parameterized by the number of candi-
dates), we can handle even the case of there not being any bound on the cardinality of the weight
set of all the voters, but rather there simply being a bound on the cardinality of the set of weights
over all manipulative voters.
Theorem 7.2 For (with any feasible tie-breaking functions) ranked pairs, it holds that weighted
coalitional manipulation is in FPT with respect to the combined parameter “number of candidates”
and “cardinality of the manipulators’ weight set” in both the succinct and nonsuccinct input models,
for both constructive and destructive manipulation, and in both the nonunique-winner model and the
unique-winner model. The same claim holds for Schulze elections, except limited to the destructive
case (in both the succinct and nonsuccinct input models, and in both the nonunique-winner model
and the unique winner model) and the unique-winner constructive case (in both the succinct and
nonsuccinct input models).6
6The nonunique-winner model, constructive case for Schulze elections—which the above theorem is carefully avoid-
ing claiming—also holds. But as noted in Section 4, a construction of Gaspers et al. [15] establishes that the weighted
constructive coalitional manipulation problem for Schulze elections is in FPT, with respect to the parameter “num-
ber of candidates,” in the nonunique-winner model. That is a broader result for nonunique-winner model, weighted
constructive coalitional manipulation than would be the nonunique-winner model, constructive, Schulze version of
Theorem 7.2, and so it would not make sense to include the nonunique-winner model, constructive Schulze case in
the statement of Theorem 7.2.
To avoid a potential worry that expert readers might have, we now briefly address a rather subtle, technical issue
related to why we have claimed the destructive Schulze case in Theorem 7.2. Although Gaspers et al. [15] for the
case of weighted manipulation of Schulze elections address only the constructive case (and even that, only for the
nonunique-winner model), it might be natural to think that their constructive result—and we have commented that
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Proof. Without loss of generality, let the candidates be 1, . . . , j, with candidate 1 being the dis-
tinguished candidate. The input specifies the nonmanipulators as a collection of votes along with
their weights (with, in the succinct case, identical-vote identical-weight votes not listed separately
but rather listed by the vote, weight, and a positive binary integer giving the number of that-vote
that-weight voters) and it specifies (for the more demanding case, that of succinct inputs) the set
of manipulators as a list of pairs, ((w1, t1), . . . , (ws, ts)), with there being ti manipulators having
weight wi (with each ti > 0). Our top-level loop will be as follows.
Algorithm 5 Top-level loop for weighted manipulation
Start
for each j-WCF K do
if candidate 1 (is/is not) (a winner/a unique winner) according to K and K is an internally
consistent, well-formed j-WCF then
(1) build an ILPFP that checks whether there is an assignment to the votes of W such that
K’s winner-set certification framework is realized by the set of votes V ∪W
(2) run that ILPFP and if it can be satisfied then halt and accept (note: the satisfying settings
will even let us output the precise manipulation that succeeds)
end if
end for
declare that the given goal cannot be reached through setting the votes of W
End
The “if” line at the start of the algorithm should be set to “is” (“is not”) for the constructive
(destructive) case, and to “a winner” (“a unique winner”) for the nonunique-winner model (the
unique-winner model). So all we need to do is to specify the ILPFP that we build inside the loop,
for each given j-WCF K.
Now, to handle this, we must be careful; since there is no limit on the overall number of weights,
we can’t have variables capturing how many voters of each occurring voter weight there are before
manipulation. Rather, we in our looping algorithm that is building the ILPFPs use the power of
our algorithm to itself precompute all the parts of the sums (appearing in the constraints) regarding
all the nonmanipulators—so it is our looping algorithm that is putting in place constants (of the
ILPFP) that express the sums of the weights of nonmanipulative voters that have various properties,
in particular, it will build the constant na,b describing the total weight of the nonmanipulative voters
casting votes that prefer candidate a to candidate b, for each pair of candidates a, b. The values
they provide even an FPT algorithm—will also hold for the destructive case and yield there an FPT result stronger
than that of Theorem 7.2. However, as mentioned earlier in this paper, their constructive result is crucially based on
the lovely fact that in the case of the weighted constructive coalitional manipulation problem for Schulze elections, if
one can make a given candidate a winner then there is a set of manipulative votes in which all manipulators vote the
same way and that candidate is selected as a winner. This does not imply, in any obvious way, that one can make the
same claim regarding the destructive case—preventing a candidate from becoming a winner. Thinking that such an
implication holds might be very tempting, based on the (untrue) thought that a candidate can be kept from winning
exactly if some other candidate can be made to win. This thought, however, is untrue in the nonunique-winner model,
as winners can coexist. In the unique-winner model, something close to this does hold though with a rather substantial
twist (see footnote 5 of [17]). But the “all can vote the same” insight used by Gaspers et al. [15] seems potentially
fragile, and is currently known only for the constructive, nonunique-winner case. Indeed, Menton and Singh [25] state
that the analogue fails for the constructive, unique-winner case. It thus remains an interesting open issue whether the
weighted destructive coalitional manipulation problem for Schulze elections is in FPT when parameterized only on
the number of candidates. This completes our explanation of why Theorem 7.2’s claim about the destructive Schulze
case (and similarly, its unique-winner model, constructive Schulze case) does not seem to be subsumed by existing
results.
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((w1, t1), . . . , (ws, ts)) describing the weights and how many manipulators there are of each weight
will be constants of the ILPFP as well. The variables of the ILPFP describe how many manipulators
of each weight get manipulated to each particular vote type: mαi for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ j! and α,
1 ≤ α ≤ s, describes how many manipulators of weight wα are assigned to vote type i.
The WCF can be implemented in terms of the Bigger and StrictlyBigger predicates and D(a, b)
as usual, with Bigger and StrictlyBigger themselves implemented in terms of D(a, b). In this case
we will express D(a, b) as the following:
na,b +
( ∑
1≤α≤s
∑
i∈pref (a,b)
wαm
α
i
)
− nb,a −
( ∑
1≤α≤s
∑
i∈pref (b,a)
wαm
α
i
)
.
Besides this we just need a few extra constraints to ensure that the manipulation chosen is a
reasonable one. We include a constraint mαi ≥ 0 for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ j!, and α, 1 ≤ α ≤ s, ensuring
that we do not try to manipulate to some type a negative number of manipulative voters of some
weight. And we include a constraint
∑
1≤i≤j!m
α
i = tα for every α, 1 ≤ α ≤ s, ensuring that we use
the same number of manipulators of every weight as are present.
With these additions, we can build an ILPFP to encode our WCF that will be polynomially
bounded in size for fixed values of the two parameters, and there will be only a constant number
of such WCFs with those fixed parameter values. Thus our algorithm specified above will run in
uniformly polynomial time with fixed parameter values, and this problem is in FPT. ❑
This still is all a valid framework for our many-uses-of-Lenstra-based approach. Note that for
the case of the cardinality of the set of weights being 1, that gives the case of weighted noncoali-
tional manipulation mentioned as an aside by Dorn and Schlotter [7], though here we’re handling
even any fixed-constant number of manipulators (since any fixed-constant number have at most a
fixed-constant cardinality of their weight set), and indeed, even a number of manipulators whose
cardinality isn’t bounded but who among them in total have a fixed-constant cardinality of occurring
weights.
Recall that we already were proving our unweighted manipulation result (Theorem 5.6) nearly
“for free,” by drawing on a related control problem’s groundwork (and in doing so, we were pointing
out an interesting connection between manipulation and control). The strength of Theorem 7.2 is
such that it gives us an alternative and even more “for free” path to seeing that Theorem 5.6 holds:
Theorem 5.6 follows from Theorem 7.2 simply by setting all the weights to 1.
It seems intuitively necessary to bound the cardinality of the manipulator weight set to achieve
results like the above. For ranked pairs we show that that is in some sense necessary: We prove
that weighted constructive coalitional manipulation (with no bound on the number of manipulator
weights) is NP-complete in ranked pairs for each fixed number of candidates starting at five. Thus
there cannot be any algorithm that is polynomial for any fixed number of (at least five) candidates,
unless P = NP. As a weaker consequence, this will also block the existence of an FPT algorithm for
this problem parameterized solely on the number of candidates.
Theorem 7.3 For any feasible tie-breaking functions, and for each fixed number of candidates, j,
j ≥ 5, weighted constructive coalitional manipulation is NP-complete for ranked pairs (under the
given feasible tie-breaking functions), in both the nonunique-winner model and the unique-winner
model. Even without the assumption that the tie-breaking functions are feasible, NP-hardness will
still hold.
Proof. Containment in NP is immediately clear if the tie-breaking functions are feasible. To prove
NP-hardness we will reduce from a known NP-hard problem, partition. Our construction will not
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make any assumptions about the tie-breaking functions. Thus we will establish NP-hardness even
for tie-breaking functions that are not feasible. As mentioned earlier, the Parkes-Xia [27] framing
of ranked pairs, which we are following in this paper, always selects precisely one winner (i.e., is
resolute). The unique-winner model and the nonunique-winner model are in effect the same in this
setting, and our result will apply for both the unique-winner model and the nonunique-winner model.
We first note that if there is a successful (constructive) ranked-pairs manipulation, then there is
a successful (constructive) ranked-pairs manipulation in which each manipulator puts p in the top
position. We will use this property in both this proof and the proof of Theorem 7.5. This fact holds
in both the nonunique-winner model and the unique-winner model (which in effect are the same
here, see above), and in both the weighted and the unweighted cases (as is clear from footnote 7’s
comments about weighted-vs.-unweighted and the fact that the “repeatedly applying” approach of
the next paragraph works fine in both cases).
In order to establish this property, we will first establish a property called monotonicity: If p is
the winner of a ranked pairs election under which a voter has ranked p immediately below another
candidate a, then if we modify the election by swapping in this voter’s preference list the position
of candidates p and a while keeping the rest of his ordering unchanged, p is still a winner under this
modified election. (The monotonicity of ranked pairs is due to Tideman, but for clarity as to the
result holding even in our flexible-tie-breaking, weighted model/case, and to naturally introduce a
notion of “encountering” that we will extensively use in this proof and that of Theorem 7.5, and
to be self-contained, we prove monotonicity here.7 Our proof of course is deeply indebted to and
inspired by Tideman’s.) The property we mentioned earlier will then be derived simply by repeatedly
applying this monotonicity property on all the manipulators until they all rank p in the top position.
We now prove monotonicity. Assume now that a voter ranks the initially winning candidate, p,
immediately below some candidate a. Swapping p and a in this voter’s preference list (while keeping
the rest of the ordering unchanged) will affect the WMG of the election only by increasing the weight
of the edge (p, a) by two and decreasing the weight of the edge (a, p) by two.
For the rest of this proof, and also for the proof of Theorem 7.5, we use a notion of “encoun-
7Let us comment on this in a bit more detail. Several formulations of ranked pairs have been shown to be
monotonic [31,32]. The formulation of ranked pairs in [32] is quite similar to ours, differing in deriving the tie-breaking
ordering over the pairs from the one over the candidates rather than allowing other orderings, and in allowing voters
to provide nonstrict rankings rather than requiring strict linear preferences. However, we argue that if one looks
very carefully at the monotonicity proof given in that work [32], it can even be seen to yield a proof valid for our
formulation. As to the difference in preference models, Tideman’s proof clearly holds when preferences are required
to always be strict, since that is a subcase of the more flexible vote model used there. As to why his proof holds
for our more flexible tie-breaking model, note that the argument in his proof relies on no details of the tie-breaking
function over the pairs except to deliver a strict ordering over the unordered pairs of candidates from the nonstrict
ordering over those pairs based on the weights of the WMG edges; crucially, it can be seen by very careful inspection
of Tideman’s proof that which particular such strict ordering the tie-breaking function on pairs delivers makes no
difference to his proof as long as the ordering is consistent with the WMG-edge-weights-based nonstrict ordering of
the pairs. Thus Tideman’s proof would apply just as well even when using our more flexible tie-breaking function over
the pairs, since even our functions indeed provide the required action of unambiguously (and efficiently) providing a
strict order for encountering pairs, and one that does respect what, as just mentioned, it must respect. (The just-made
comments were about the tie-breaking function over pairs. Our tie-breaking function over the individual candidates
is in the same model as the one used in that work, and so requires no specific discussion here.) Besides that, although
that proof is given for the unweighted case, it is clear from the definition of monotonicity that if monotonicity holds
for the unweighted case, it also holds for the weighted case. Thus, taking all of these points together, one can see that
that proof can be argued to apply in our case as well (and of course it applies for both the nonunique-winner model
and the unique winner model, since they coincide, as ranked pairs always selects exactly one winner). Nonetheless,
to be self-contained, and to naturally introduce a notion of “encountering” that we will extensively use in the rest
of the proof of Theorem 7.3 and also in the proof of Theorem 7.5, in our main text we give a proof of monotonicity
(phased to clearly work in our model, which as mentioned above is more flexible that Tideman’s regarding tie-breaking
functions).
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tering,” defined as follows: The pair {x, y} is said to be encountered when the ranked pairs winner
determination algorithm first considers either of the edges (x, y) and (y, x). Each pair is encountered
exactly once (although if when it is encountered the relationship between its candidates has already
been transitively set, both edges regarding the pair are simply discarded). Clearly, the order in
which the pairs are encountered by the algorithm is fixed once the tie-breaking functions and the
weights of the WMG edges are specified.
Recall that the weights of all the WMG edges except (a, p) and (p, a) remain unchanged after
our modification to the initial election. This implies that the relative order in which pairs are
encountered can change regarding only {a, p}’s relation to other pairs. In particular, if under the
modified election the order of encountering pairs differs from the initial election, it differs only in
moving forward or moving backward the encountering of the pair {a, p}.
We decompose the rest of the proof of monotonicity into three cases.
Case 1: The edge (p, a) has positive weight in the initial WMG, or the edge (p, a) has zero weight in
the initial WMG but p is preferred to a according to the tie-breaking function among candidates. In
this case, the shifting of p from immediately below a to immediately above a in the vote of one voter
means that the maximum weight (“max”ed of course over the actual values, not over the absolute
values) among (p, a) and (a, p) in the modified graph will be two greater than in the original graph,
and will in fact occur on (p, a), which will now certainly have strictly positive weight. And so the
order in which pairs are encountered will be exactly the same except possibly for {a, p} shifting to
an earlier point in that order.
Now, under the initial WMG (and the tie-breaking functions, but we will now mostly stop
mentioning those except when important, as those functions don’t change between the initial and
the modified cases), p ≻ a in the final outcome, as p was the winner.
If p ≻ a was set directly at the moment {a, p} was encountered in the initial ordering, then under
our modified ordering p ≻ a will certainly also be set directly when {a, p} is encountered, since
the encounter is no later (and so no prefix before the encounter, as the process unfolds under the
modified graph, can relate p and a transitively, since if one did, that same prefix would have existed
in the initial graph and would have set their relation transitively), and (p, a) will have positive weight
when it is encountered.
If p ≻ a was set transitively (i.e., before {a, p} was encountered) under the initial WMG’s ordering
of encounters, then since in the modified case {a, p} is encountered in the same place or earlier, if
it now still comes after the prefix that transitively set p ≻ a the modified case will still have p ≻ a
(due to that identical prefix), and if it now comes before the prefix that transitively set p ≻ a the
modified case will have p ≻ a because (p, a) is positive. p will remain the winner.
So under Case 1, p ≻ a will still hold under ranked pairs with respect to the modified WMG.
Furthermore, in the modified case, the pairs that are encountered after {p, a}, but were encountered
in the initial case before {p, a} and were not discarded, will not be inconsistent with the order p ≻ a
as this order was established in the initial case too, at latest when {p, a} was encountered. Thus, for
each such pair, at the moment when that pair is encountered in the modified case, the same order
established by its encounter in the initial case either has already been transitively set by a prefix
involving p ≻ a or will be fixed by that encounter. Also, as to the pairs that were encountered in
the initial case before {p, a} and were discarded, they will also be discarded in the modified case
due to the identical prefix that transitively set the order for those pairs in the initial case. Thus the
same orders will be fixed in the modified case as in the initial case, and the final ordering will be
the same. As a consequence, p will remain the winner with respect to the modified WMG.
Case 2: The edge (p, a) has zero weight in the initial WMG and a is preferred to p according to the
tie-breaking function among candidates. The maximum weight of (p, a) and (a, p) in the original
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WMG was zero, as both were zero, but the maximum is two in the modified WMG. And so the
order in which pairs are encountered will be exactly the same except possibly for {a, p} shifting to
an earlier point in that order.
If the relationship between a and p was not set transitively in the initial case, then a ≻ p would
be the outcome of the encounter (due to the specification of Case 2), contradicting our assumption
that p ≻ a in the initial case’s overall outcome.
So in the initial case, p versus a must have been set transitively (and thus, necessarily, before
{a, p} was encountered), and must have been set transitively so as to yield p ≻ a. In the modified
case, we have that (p, a) has positive weight and the ordering of encounters is unchanged except for
{a, p} possibly moving earlier. So since (p, a) is positive, if the relationship between p and a is not
transitively set before {a, p} is encountered in the modified ordering, then p ≻ a gets set at that
encounter. And if the relationship between a and b is transitively set on a prefix of the modified
ordering before {a, p} is encountered, then that same prefix must have set p ≻ a transitively in
the initial case, since that prefix will be identical in both cases (because the encounter didn’t move
forward by the modification), and so it will be set as p ≻ a in our modified case.
So under Case 2, p ≻ a will still hold under ranked pairs with respect to the modified WMG.
Furthermore, similarly to the argument we made at the end of Case 1, the same orders will be
established for pairs that in the initial case were encountered before {a, p} but now are encountered
after {a, p} in the modified case. Thus the same orders will be fixed in the modified case as in the
initial case, and the final ordering will be the same. As a consequence, p will remain the winner.
Case 3: The edge (p, a) has negative weight in the initial WMG. Note that, unlike our other two
cases, in this case the modification decreases by two the maximum among the weights of (p, a) and
(a, p), and so the modified ordering of encounters will be identical to the original except the pair
{a, p} may be pushed back to a later location in the ordering.
Now, if the relationship between a and p was not set transitively in the original, then we would
have had a ≻ p in the original case’s outcome, since (a, p) has positive weight in the original case.
But we know that p ≻ a in the original case’s outcome, and so in the original, p ≻ a must be fixed
transitively before {a, p} is encountered.
But {a, p} is encountered in the same place or later, so whatever prefix transitively set p ≻ a
in the original will also occur, and transitively sets p ≻ a, in the modified case, all before {a, p} is
encountered.
So under Case 3, the pair {a, p} gets discarded in both the initial and the modified election, and
since we already noted that the order of encountering pairs does not change by the modification
except possibly for {a, p}’s relation to other pairs, the orders will be fixed in the modified case in
exactly the same way as in the initial case and as a consequence, p will remain the winner.
This concludes our proof of monotonicity for ranked pairs, for both the weighted and unweighted
cases. And as we discussed earlier, we can repeatedly apply the above-mentioned modification to
the preference list of the manipulators until they all rank p in the top position (while keeping the
rest of the ordering unchanged); so for ranked pairs, if there is a manipulation making p win, then
there is a manipulation making p win in which all manipulators rank p first.
We now move on to give this proof’s reduction, which is from the partition problem. (Recall
that a partition of a set A is a pair of disjoint sets A1 and A2 such that A1 ∪A2 = A.)
Definition 7.4 (Partition, see [14]) Given a list of n integers, k1, . . . , kn, does there exist a par-
tition of {1, . . . , n} into two sets, I1 and I2, such that
∑
i∈I1
ki =
∑
j∈I2
kj?
Fix a j, j ≥ 5. Given a partition instance, k1, . . . , kn, we will construct a weighted constructive
coalitional manipulation instance (C, V,W, p), where C is a candidate set with ‖C‖ = j, V is a
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Figure 3: The important part of the WMG with just the nonmanipulators having cast their votes.
(Most back-edges are left implicit, using the fact that the weight of an edge (a, b) in a WMG is
negative one times the weight of (b, a).)
nonmanipulative voter set (each having a weight and voting by a tie-free linear order), W is a
collection of manipulative voters (each starting as a blank-slate vote and having a weight), and p is
a distinguished candidate.
The candidate set, C, will contain five important candidates: the distinguished candidate p and
four other candidates: a1, a2, b1, and b2. There will also be j − 5 extra candidates that we will
ensure are always easily beaten by p. The extra candidates are added just for the purpose of reaching
the specified number of candidates. (Recall that we fixed j in the beginning. Thus we present a
construction that will directly work for each j, j ≥ 5. Alternatively, we could have presented the
construction for five candidates first, and then extend it to larger numbers of candidates.)
Let S =
∑n
i=1 ki. We will have n manipulators and their weights will be 6k1, 6k2, . . . , 6kn.
The nonmanipulators will, in polynomial time using McGarvey’s method (this claim is justified by
Appendix B), be assigned votes and weights such that the important candidates induce the WMG
shown in Figure 3, and for every extra candidate e and each important candidate c (i.e., for each
c ∈ {a1, a2, b1, b2, p}), D(c, e) = 18S + 4 (so that these edges remain large—at least 12S + 4—
regardless of the manipulators’ votes).
Now we will show that there is a solution to the partition instance if and only if there is a solution
to the manipulation instance.
We will show that if there is a solution to the mapped-to manipulation instance, there must be
a solution to the mapped-from partition instance. Suppose there is a solution for the manipulation
instance. Namely, there is a set V ′ of n votes with weights as per W such that p wins the election
(C, V ∪V ′). Due to the claim established earlier in this proof, we know that if such a V ′ exists then
such a V ′ exists in which each manipulator ranks p first; so we will take V ′ to have p at the top of
each manipulator’s vote.
Let us use D ′(a, b) to denote the weight of the WMG edge (a, b) after manipulation. Thus we
will have D ′(p, a1) = D
′(p, a2) = 4 and D
′(b1, p) = D
′(b2, p) = 2. Also the weight of the edges from
p to the extra candidates will become so large that under ranked pairs their relationship with p is
fixed (namely, p beats each) before the relationships between p and the important candidates are set.
So, in the final ranking, p is clearly placed higher than all extra candidates (we do not care about
the relative order between pairs of extra candidates, since that does not affect p’s performance).
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Also, we will have D ′(b1, a2) ≥ 12S + 4 and D ′(b2, a1) ≥ 12S + 4, regardless of the manipulators’
votes. These edges will thus be considered before every other edge in the subgraph induced by the
important candidates. Thus the orders b1 ≻ a2 and b2 ≻ a1 will necessarily be fixed in the final
ranking (and, by the way, we’ll have that directly, not transitively). We argue that at least one of the
edges (a1, b1) or (a2, b2) must achieve a nonnegative weight. Otherwise there will not be any path
of nonnegative weight edges from p to b1 and b2, and since D
′(b1, p) = 2, that means no sequence
of candidate pairs that can transitively establish p ≻ b1 or p ≻ b2 in the final ranking can possibly
all be encountered come before (b1, p) and (b2, p) are considered, and so we will eventually have
b1 ≻ p and b2 ≻ p in the final ranking. But since the manipulator weights are all multiples of 6 (and
the total manipulation weight is 6S and D(a1, b1) = D(a2, b2) = (−6S) + 4), the only nonnegative
weight the edges (a1, b1) and (a2, b2) can possibly achieve is 4. In particular D
′(a1, b1) ≥ 0 only
when D′(a1, b1) = 4, and this happens only if all the manipulators prefer a1 to b1. Analogously
D′(a2, b2) ≥ 0 only when D′(a2, b2) = 4, and this happens only if all the manipulators prefer a2 to
b2.
We have established that at least one of the edges (a1, b1) or (a2, b2) must achieve a nonnegative
weight. Now, without loss of generality (as the other case—namely that (a2, b2) achieves nonnegative
weight—is symmetric), assume that (a1, b1) achieves nonnegative weight. And so, as we have argued,
it even holds that D ′(a1, b1) = 4. We argue that D
′(b1, b2) = 0. Otherwise, we would have one of
two cases (note that the manipulator weights are all multiples of 6 and D(b1, b2) = 0, so D
′(b1, b2)
must be a multiple of 6):
1. D ′(b1, b2) ≥ 6: In this case, (b1, b2) will be considered before (a1, b1) and the order b1 ≻ b2
will be fixed in the final ranking. Since we already have the order b2 ≻ a1, by transitivity,
we have b1 ≻ a1 and (a1, b1) gets discarded. Thus the order between p and b1 will not be
specified transitively by any sequence of fixed orders before the edge (b1, p) is considered. And
when (b1, p) is considered, b1 ≻ p would be set. So p would not be a winner, contradicting our
assumption that we have a successful manipulation on the given instance.
2. D ′(b2, b1) ≥ 6: We have two subcases here (keeping in mind still that D(b2, a2) = 6S − 4, the
manipulators total 6S in weight, and each manipulator’s weight is a multiple of 6).
(a) D ′(a2, b2) = 4: In this case, (b2, b1) will be considered before (a2, b2) and the order b2 ≻ a2
will be fixed by transitivity before considering that edge. Then the only nonnegative
incoming edge to b2, which is (a2, b2), gets discarded, and eventually, when (b2, p) is
considered, p will be ranked lower than b2.
(b) D ′(b2, a2) ≥ 2: In this case, since there will not be any nonnegative incoming edge to b2,
p will be ranked lower than b2 when considering (b2, p).
Thus it must hold that D(b1, b2) = 0. We now can build a solution for the partition problem as
follows. For every manipulator i (which has the weight 6ki) having ranked b1 higher than b2, we
make I1 include i, and for every manipulator j (which has the weight 6kj) having ranked b2 higher
than b1, we make I2 include j. Then (I1, I2) is clearly a solution to the partition problem.
We will show that if there is a solution to the mapped-from partition instance, then there must
be a solution to the mapped-to manipulation instance. Suppose there is a solution for the partition
problem. That is, we have a partition of {1, . . . , n} into I1 and I2, such that
∑
i∈I1
ki =
∑
j∈I2
kj .
We make every manipulator i with i ∈ I1 cast the following vote:
p > a1 > a2 > b1 > b2 > . . .
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(where [. . .] denotes the extra candidates in any arbitrary order), and make every manipulator j
with j ∈ I2 cast the following vote:
p > a2 > a1 > b2 > b1 > . . . .
After the manipulation, we will have D ′(a1, a2) = D
′(b1, b2) = 0 and D
′(a1, b1) = D
′(a2, b2) = 4.
So, after having fixed in the final ranking the orders b1 ≻ a2, b2 ≻ a1, p ≻ a1, and p ≻ a2, the edges
(a1, b1) and (a2, b2) will be considered, giving the final orders p ≻ a1 ≻ b1 and p ≻ a2 ≻ b2. So, we
will have a transitive order from p to both b1 and b2 and p will be a winner. ❑
One might naturally wonder whether the constant five is tight for the NP-hardness result pre-
sented in Theorem 7.3. Theorem 7.5 proves that five indeed is tight here, by showing that for each
number of candidates smaller than five, we can solve the manipulation problem under consideration
in polynomial time. The key idea is to show that, for each ranked-pairs instance with fewer than
five candidates, it holds that if there exists a successful manipulation, then for that same instance
there exists a successful manipulation in which all the manipulators vote the same.
Theorem 7.5 For any feasible tie-breaking functions, and for each number of candidates, j, j < 5,
weighted constructive coalitional manipulation is solvable in polynomial time for ranked pairs (under
the given feasible tie-breaking functions), in both the nonunique-winner model and the unique-winner
model.
Proof. We will show that in instances with fewer than five candidates, if a successful manipulation
exists, then there exists a manipulation where all the manipulators cast the same vote.
In light of this fact, there are only a constant number of vote types to check regardless of the
number of manipulators. Thus we merely need, for each vote type, to run the ranked-pairs winner
determination procedure on the election that consists of the nonmanipulators having cast their votes,
and the manipulators all having cast a vote of that particular type. Thus we have a polynomial-time
algorithm.
All that remains is to prove, for every number of candidates smaller than five, that if a successful
manipulation exists, then there exists a manipulation where all the manipulators cast the same
vote. For each number of candidates less than five, we first assume that there exists a successful
manipulation and then argue that we can still achieve the goal, even if all the manipulators cast
identical votes. (In fact, we will even argue that if the number of candidates is less than five
and a successful manipulation exists, then there exists a successful manipulation in which all the
manipulators cast the same vote and that vote has p as the most preferred candidate.) As before
our result immediately applies to both winner models, since ranked pairs always selects exactly one
winner.
Recall that, regardless of the number of candidates, if there exists a manipulation, then there
exists a manipulation where all the manipulators rank p at the top position (this claim is discussed
and justified in the proof of Theorem 7.3). So we can safely assume that, in the successful manipu-
lation, all the manipulators rank the distinguished candidate at the top position. This immediately
proves our claim for j ≤ 2. For the remaining values of j that we need to handle, namely j = 3
and j = 4, we will show that if we have a successful manipulation, we can make p win with all the
manipulators agreeing on the rest of their rankings in addition to all ranking p first.
For j = 3, let the set of candidates be C = {p, a, b} with p being the distinguished candidate. As
we discussed earlier, all the manipulators rank p at the top position. This lets us know, beforehand,
the weight of the WMG edges (p, a) and (p, b) after the manipulation, regardless of the manipulators’
preferences over a and b.
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We now consider the moment when the pair {a, b} is encountered (the notion of encountering is
as defined in the proof of Theorem 7.3). At that time, the order between a and b has already been
fixed in the final ranking only if it has been fixed transitively by a sequence of orders including p.
However, this can happen only if a ≻ p or b ≻ p has been already set at that time, which cannot
happen since we have assumed a successful manipulation. Thus the order between a and b, in the
final ranking, will be determined right at the time when the pair {a, b} is encountered. Let us assume
without loss of generality (as the two cases are symmetric) that the order being fixed is a ≻ b. We
claim that all the manipulators can vote p > a > b with p still winning the manipulated election.
This change of the manipulators’ votes will not weaken the weight of the edge (a, b) and will not
change the weight of the edges involving p. Thus when {a, b} is encountered, the order a ≻ b will
be fixed in the final ranking as before, except that this pair might be encountered earlier, before the
pairs {a, p} or {b, p}. However, earlier fixing of the order a ≻ b cannot prevent p from winning.
Finally, for j = 4, let the set of candidates be C = {p, a, b, c} with p being the distinguished
candidate. Again we are assuming that each manipulator puts p in his or her top position.
Let us assume without loss of generality that after the manipulation has occurred, among the
pairs not including p, the ranked-pairs winner determination algorithm encounters the pairs in the
order {a, b}, {a, c}, and {b, c}.
In a similar fashion to the argument we made for the case of j = 3, at the moments when {a, b}
and {a, c} are encountered, the edges between these pairs would get discarded by a transitively fixed
order only if the sequence of orders establishing that order includes p, which cannot happen since
we have assumed a successful manipulation. So for the first two pairs that are encountered among
these three pairs, their relative order is fixed right at that time and this can be done in four different
ways:
1. The orders a ≻ b and a ≻ c are fixed.
2. The orders b ≻ a and c ≻ a are fixed.
3. The orders b ≻ a and a ≻ c are fixed.
4. The orders a ≻ b and c ≻ a are fixed.
In the first two cases, when the pair {b, c} is being encountered, the relative order of b and c has
not been fixed yet. Thus it will be fixed according to whichever of (b, c) and (c, b) is considered first
and according to the tie-breaking function that handles zero-weight edges if these edges are of weight
zero. Since b and c are symmetric in both cases, let us assume without loss of generality that b ≻ c
is what gets fixed. We now claim that all the manipulators can cast the vote p > a > b > c in the
first case (of our above list of four cases) and p > b > c > a in the second case, with p still winning
the manipulated election. To argue for the first case, we note this change will not weaken any of the
edges among (a, b), (a, c), and (b, c). What might be affected instead is the order in which the pairs
are encountered, either among the pairs {a, b}, {a, c}, and {b, c} or between these pairs and the pairs
involving p (the pairs not involving p may be encountered before some of the pairs involving p that
they used to be encountered after). The latter is obviously of no concern if we can show that for
each pair of the candidates not involving p, the same order will be fixed as before at latest when that
pair is encountered. We now argue that the orders being fixed for the pairs not involving p will be
exactly the same as before. Note that since the weights of the edges (a, b), (a, c), and (b, c) are not
weakened by the modification to the manipulators’ votes, for the first two pairs being encountered
among {a, b}, {a, c}, and {b, c} (please keep in mind the “without loss of generality” assumptions,
two and four paragraphs before the present one, as to the order of encountering among these), the
encounter of those pairs establishes the same order as before (i.e. a ≻ b for {a, b}, a ≻ c for {a, c},
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and b ≻ c for {b, c}). Furthermore, when the last pair among these three is encountered, no sequence
of orders has transitively set the order between the candidates in that pair. So that encounter will
also establish the same order as before. This proves that the final ordering is the same as before
and all the manipulators can safely cast the vote p > a > b > c in the first case. The argument for
the second case is analogous.
The second two cases, though, are a bit different since the order between b and c is set transitively
by the orders b ≻ a and a ≻ c in the third case, or by the orders c ≻ a and a ≻ b in the fourth
case. We claim that in the third case all the manipulators can vote p > b > a > c and p will
still win the manipulated election. Note that this set of manipulative votes might strengthen the
weight of the edges (b, a) and (a, c) and (b, c) and allow their corresponding pairs to be encountered
in an arrangement different from the initial manipulation (plus the pairs not involving p may be
encountered before some of the pairs involving p that they used to be encountered after, but again
this is not important if we can show that for each pair of the candidates not involving p, the same
order will be fixed as before at latest when that pair is encountered). However, under the modified
manipulation, this will not change the orders being fixed assuming that the pair {b, c} is the last
pair being encountered among the three. But even if {b, c} is no longer the last pair, we argue that
the final ordering will be exactly the same. Note that since the weights of the edges (b, a) and (a, c)
are not weakened by the modification to the manipulators’ votes, the encounter of the first pair
among {a, b} and {a, c} establishes the same order as before (i.e. b ≻ a for {a, b} and a ≻ c for
{a, c}), regardless of when {b, c} is encountered. And the encounter of the second pair establishes
the same order as before, except possibly if that second pair gets discarded due to the order being
transitively set (of course by a sequence of orders not involving p). So the only way the final ordering
might differ from the initial manipulation is either when the encounter of the pair {b, c} establishes
the order c ≻ b or when the second-encountered pair among {a, b} and {a, c} gets discarded by a
sequence of orders including an order between b and c. The latter itself could happen only if the
encounter of the pair {b, c} establishes the order c ≻ b (so that along with b ≻ a it transitively fixes
the order c ≻ a, or that along with a ≻ c it transitively fixes the order a ≻ b). However, the weight
of the edge (c, b) under the initial manipulation must have been at least as large as its weight under
the modified manipulation. Furthermore, the weights of the edges (b, a) and (a, c) under the initial
manipulation have to be at most as large as their weights under the modified manipulation. Thus
if under the modified manipulation the order c ≻ b is ever set, {b, c} could not have been the last
pair that was encountered among the three under the initial manipulation, which contradicts our
assumption. So all the manipulators can cast the vote p > b > a > c and p will still win. In the
fourth case, the manipulators can analogously vote p > c > a > b and p will continue to win.
This proves that for each number of candidates j, j ≤ 4, if a successful manipulation exists,
then there exists a manipulation where all the manipulators vote the same. This in turn proves
that weighted constructive coalitional manipulation is solvable in polynomial time for each number
of candidates j, j < 5. ❑
8 Open Problems
For all cases of (unweighted) bribery, control, and manipulation, including many where general-
case hardness results exist, this paper proves that Schulze elections and ranked-pairs elections are
fixed-parameter tractable with respect to the number of candidates.
In order to concisely represent our unweighted results, we list in Figure 4 the best currently
known tractability and intractability results regarding the unweighted case. All the figure’s FPT
results hold for both the constructive and destructive cases, in both the succinct and nonsuccinct
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Voting Rules
Schulze Ranked Pairs
Bribery FPT [Thm. 5.1], NPC [34] FPT [Thm. 5.2], NPC [34]
Manipulation P [15] FPT [Thm. 5.6], NPC [35]
Control by
adding cand. FPT [Thm. 6.1], NPC [27] FPT [Thm. 6.1], NPC [27]
deleting cand. FPT [Thm. 6.1], NPC [24] FPT [Thm. 6.1], NPC [27]
partition of cand. FPT [Thm. 6.1], NPC [24] FPT [Thm. 6.1]
adding voters FPT [Thm. 5.3], NPC [27] FPT [Thm. 5.3], NPC [27]
deleting voters FPT [Thm. 5.4], NPC [27] FPT [Thm. 5.4], NPC [27]
partition of voters FPT [Thm. 5.5], NPC [24] FPT [Thm. 5.5]
Figure 4: Best current tractability and intractability results regarding the unweighted case of Schulze
and ranked pairs, for constructive attacks in the nonsuccinct input model and for the nonunique-
winner model. Our FPT results that are achieved by the looping-over-framework approach are
shown in boldface.
input models, and for both the unique-winner and nonunique-winner models. Due to some of the
other NPC cases not having been explored in the literature, though, Figure 4 limits itself to speak
just about the constructive case in the nonsuccinct input model and in the nonunique-winner model.
The most striking remaining open direction regards the weighted cases. For example, Gaspers
et al. [15] proved that the constructive, nonunique-winner case of weighted coalitional manipulation
is in FPT. Can their result be extended to the constructive, unique-winner case, or the destructive,
unique-winner case, or the destructive, nonunique-winner case? Can one even provide a fixed-
parameter tractability result for these three cases? These all remain open questions, although in
Theorem 7.2 we give fixed-parameter tractability results for special cases of all three of these issues.
The analogous issues are not open for ranked pairs: Theorem 7.3 shows that unless P = NP, the
ranked-pairs analogue of the Gaspers et al. result cannot hold.
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A An Alternative Schulze Winner Certification Framework
The following discussion may certainly be skipped, except by curious readers or readers wanting
to get more of a sense of the flavors that winner certification frameworks can have. In particular,
the following discussion presents an alternative Schulze winner certification framework to the one
described above; the above-described framework is the one we used throughout this paper. The
alternative framework we will now describe in some ways is very clear (as to information it holds
and counting how many such structures there are) but in some ways is a bit subtle (as to the
time-cost of seeing whether they really certify that a given person is a winner).
Our SWCFs, as just described and as we use throughout the paper, are very explicitly certifying
why a given candidate is a Schulze winner. We mention that one could alternatively loop over a
different type of structure that many may find more easier to understand as a clean, clear structure to
loop over since it is basically a triangular matrix with 3-valued entries, namely, {<,=, >}. Namely,
consider a table that for each pair of edges-between-candidates says whether the first has a weight
greater than, equal to, or less than the other. This structure certainly has enough information
to tell whether a given candidate is in the Schulze winner set. So we could loop over all such
tables making our candidate of interest a winner (or if in the “destructive” case, not a winner).
The fact that some such tables can never be realized since they set up violations of transitivity—
e.g., n1 < n2 < n3 < n1—is not a problem for the way we’ll use our SWCFs; we’ll use them in
ILPFPs related to attack types, and unrealizable tables of course can never be realized by any attack
actions since they can’t be realized at all, and so they will not harm our algorithms. In some sense,
this attractive approach is making the SWCFs more oblique as to why they ensure that a given
candidate is a winner, but since these structures are simply a big ternary triangular matrix, they
are very simple structures to loop through and are very simple structures for which to see that their
number is bounded for each fixed number of candidates. In particular—and we make no attempt
to try to take advantage here of the “negative one factor” relationship between (a, b) and (b, a)
weights—there are certainly at most 3(p
2−p)/2 such structures, where p = 2
(
‖C‖
2
)
.
Since we won’t return to a discussion of this alternate approach, we mention now two issue that
are relevant to why it would work as an approach. In the ILPFPs we’ll build later, we’ll loop through
the SWCFs and will have to in the ILPFP capture whether the structure can be realized. But the
tools we build for the framework we actually use make it very clear that in our ILPFPs we can
ensure that a collection of <, =, and > relationships hold, and so it would be easy to modify our
ILPFPs to enforce the claims of our ternary triangular matrices. The more subtle and interesting
issue is that in our ILPFPs we need to tell whether a given SWCF makes a given candidate (or
precludes a given candidate from being) a winner. For the SWCFs we are using in our paper, this
is a trivial, immediate check. But for the ternary triangular matrix approach, which gives us just
<-vs.-=-vs.-> information, it is not even clear we can check winnership in polynomial time in the
size of the matrix, given that there are an exponential number of potential simple paths between
two points. However, the key insight to have that quells that worry is that that issue is irrelevant to
ensuring membership in the class FPT, which is the goal of this paper. Even if determining whether
a given ternary triangular matrix makes someone a winner takes time exponential in the size of the
matrix (which itself is as noted above of size roughly quartic in the number of candidates), this
is a constant for each fixed number of candidates, and so does not in any way interfere with our
FPT claims. Again, in our paper we are not using the ternary triangular approach, and so all our
ILPFPs are in terms of our primary approach. But this appendix is here to make clear that the
ternary triangular approach certainly would work, if implemented with the care and cautions just
mentioned.
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B McGarvey’s Method
McGarvey’s method [22], is quite simple. However, to be self-contained, and since in one of the three
times we draw on it we are using it in a weighted-voting setting (namely, in the proof of Theorem 7.3),
where it—see below—works very slightly differently, we now provide a description of McGarvey’s
method. Suppose we are given some WMG, and we wish to generate a set of votes realizing it. The
one-candidate case isn’t interesting, so we assume that there are at least two candidates. Since we
are speaking of a WMG, for each (a, b), a 6= b, it must hold that the weight on (a, b) is negative
one times the weight on (b, a). Also, either all of the edges are even in weight or all are odd. In
particular, in the case we are now discussing, the unweighted case, the parity of each edge weight is
the parity of the number of voters; in the weighted case, which we will discuss later in this appendix,
the parity of each edge will be the parity of the total vote weight. Suppose the candidates are a,
b, and c1 . . . , cz, z ≥ 0. Consider adding the following two votes: a > b > c1 > · · · > cz and
cz > cz−1 > · · · > c1 > a > b. This vote pair increases by two the weight of the edge from a to b in
the WMG, decreases by two the weight of the edge from b to a in the WMG, and leaves all other
edges unchanged in the WMG. Of course, this trick can be used not just on a and b, but on any
pair of distinct candidates.
So in the case of unweighted voting, if the (target) edge weights are even we can, for each pair of
candidates, simply keep adding a pair of votes to shift in the right direction, by two, the weights on
the edges between them, until the desired values are reached. If the (target) edge weights are odd,
we can initially add one arbitrarily chosen vote, thus making all edges odd in weight, and then can
appropriately add pairs of votes as before to bring the weights to the desired values. This clearly
can be done in time polynomial in the sum of (a) the sum of the absolute values of the edge weights,
and (b) the size of the problem (i.e., the total size of the candidate names and the total size of the
edge weight descriptions, though the latter is in fact handled by (a)). Of course, if the edge weights
are large, this could take an exponential amount of time unless the edge weights are coded in unary.
However, in this paper, everywhere where we are using McGarvey’s method for unweighted voting,
the absolute values of the edge weights are bounded by a small constant, so this is not an issue.
However, when we invoke McGarvey’s method in the proof of Theorem 7.3, it is used in a
weighted-voting context, and for WMGs where the sum of the absolute values of the edge weights
often will be exponential in the problem size. That is no problem, though, since in the weighted-
voting case, in the even-weight case, if the desired values of the WMG edges (e, f) and (f, e) are
2w and −2w, with w a nonnegative integer, we simply add the two votes mentioned above, using e
and f in the roles of a and b, with each vote being a weight-w vote. And we do this for each pair of
distinct candidates. In the odd-weight case we can again just initially add an arbitrary weight-one
vote to make the weights odd, and then for every pair we can add the appropriately chosen pair of
votes (of weights of either both w or both w + 1, depending on the current edge weights set by the
one initial vote) to bring the edge weights to the desired values of 2w + 1 and −2w − 1.
So for the weighted-vote case, we can clearly generate a realizing set of votes in time polynomial
in the size of the problem instance (the sum of the sizes of all the weights—not the sum of their
values but the sum of the sizes of their binary encodings—plus the sum of the sizes of the candidate
names).
C Control Definitions
In this section, we provide more formal definitions of the benchmark control types. Since such papers
as [2,17,12] provide a detailed discussion of the motivations of and real-world inspirations for the
benchmark control types, we don’t repeat the discussion here.
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The statements below are taken, sometimes identically, from Faliszewski et al. [12]. We first define
the voter-control types, since those are more central in this paper. Then we define the candidate-
control types, which in this paper appear only in Section 6. All definitions below are stated for the
nonsuccinct, nonunique-winner model. Section 6’s comments specify how to modify these to define
the succinct case and/or the unique-winner case.
C.1 Voter-Control Definitions
The adding-voter control problems are the following.
Name: The constructive control by adding voters problem for E elections and the destructive control
by adding voters problem for E elections.
Given: A set C of candidates, two disjoint collections of voters, V and W (each voter’s vote is a
tie-free linear order), a distinguished candidate p, and a nonnegative integer k.
Question (constructive): Is there a subset Q, ‖Q‖ ≤ k, of voters in W such that the voters in
V ∪Q jointly elect p ∈ C as a winner according to system E?
Question (destructive): Is there a subset Q, ‖Q‖ ≤ k, of voters in W such that the voters in
V ∪Q do not elect p as a winner according to system E?
The deleting-voter control problems are the following.
Name: The constructive control by deleting voters problem for E elections and the destructive
control by deleting voters problem for E elections.
Given: A set C of candidates, a collection V of voters (each voter’s vote is a tie-free linear order),
a distinguished candidate p ∈ C, and a nonnegative integer k.
Question (constructive): Is it possible to by deleting at most k voters ensure that p is a winner
of the resulting E election?
Question (destructive): Is it possible to by deleting at most k voters ensure that p is not a winner
of the resulting E election?
As mentioned in Section 3, each partition problem has two variants, based on how ties are handled
in the preliminary (i.e., first) round. In the ties-eliminate tie-handling model, if a first-round election
does not have a unique winner then no one from that subelection moves forward to the second round.
In the ties-promote tie-handling model, if a first-round election does not have a unique winner then
all winners (if any) from that subelection move forward to the second round. This issue of which
tie-handling rule is used is what is referred to in the definition below (and later, in the definitions
of candidate partitioning) by the phrase “that survive the tie-handling rule.”
Name: The constructive control by partition of voters problem for E elections and the destructive
control by partition of voters problem for E elections.
Given: A set C of candidates, a collection V of voters (each voter’s vote is a tie-free linear order),
and a distinguished candidate p ∈ C.
Question (constructive): Is there a partition of V into V1 and V2 such that p is a winner of
the two-stage election where the winners of election (C, V1) that survive the tie-handling rule
compete against the winners of (C, V2) that survive the tie-handling rule? Each subelection
(in both stages) is conducted using election system E .
42
Question (destructive): Is there a partition of V into V1 and V2 such that p is not a winner of
the two-stage election where the winners of election (C, V1) that survive the tie-handling rule
compete against the winners of (C, V2) that survive the tie-handling rule? Each subelection
(in both stages) is conducted using election system E .
C.2 Candidate-Control Definitions
The unlimited-adding candidate control problems are the following.
Name: The constructive control by adding an unlimited number of candidates problem for E elec-
tions and the destructive control by adding an unlimited number of candidates problem for E
elections.
Given: Disjoint sets C and D of candidates, a collection V of voters (each voter’s vote is a tie-free
linear order over the candidates in the set C ∪D), and a distinguished candidate p ∈ C.
Question (constructive): Is there a subset E of D such that p is a winner of the E election with
voters V and candidates C ∪ E?
Question (destructive): Is there a subset E of D such that p is not a winner of the E election
with voters V and candidates C ∪ E?
The adding-candidate control problems are the following.
Name: The constructive control by adding candidates problem for E elections and the destructive
control by adding candidates problem for E elections.
Given: Disjoint sets C and D of candidates, a collection V of voters (each voter’s vote is a tie-free
linear order over the candidates in the set C ∪D), and a distinguished candidate p ∈ C, and
a nonnegative integer k.
Question (constructive): Is there a subset E of D such that ‖E‖ ≤ k and p is a winner of the E
election with voters V and candidates C ∪ E?
Question (destructive): Is there a subset E of D such that ‖E‖ ≤ k and p is not a winner of the
E election with voters V and candidates C ∪ E?
The deleting-candidate control problems are the following.
Name: The constructive control by deleting candidates problem for E elections and the destructive
control by deleting candidates problem for E elections.
Given: A set C of candidates, a collection V of voters (each voter’s vote is a tie-free linear order),
a distinguished candidate p ∈ C, and a nonnegative integer k.
Question (constructive): Is it possible to by deleting at most k candidates ensure that p is a
winner of the resulting E election?
Question (destructive): Is it possible to by deleting at most k candidates other than p ensure
that p is not a winner of the resulting E election?
The runoff-partition candidate control problems are the following. In runoff-partition candidate
control problems, each candidate must participate in precisely one of the two first-round preliminary
elections.
43
Name: The constructive control by runoff partition of candidates problem for E elections and the
destructive control by runoff partition of candidates problem for E elections.
Given: A set C of candidates, a collection V of voters (each voter’s vote is a tie-free linear order),
and a distinguished candidate p ∈ C.
Question (constructive): Is there a partition of C into C1 and C2 such that p is a winner of the
two-stage election where the winners of subelection (C1, V ) that survive the tie-handling rule
compete against the winners of subelection (C2, V ) that survive the tie-handling rule? Each
subelection (in both stages) is conducted using election system E .
Question (destructive): Is there a partition of C into C1 and C2 such that p is not a winner of
the two-stage election where the winners of subelection (C1, V ) that survive the tie-handling
rule compete against the winners of subelection (C2, V ) that survive the tie-handling rule?
Each subelection (in both stages) is conducted using election system E .
The partition candidate control problems are the following. In partition candidate control prob-
lems, the partition is between candidates who participate in a first-round preliminary election and
candidates who get a “bye” through the first round.
Name: The constructive control by partition of candidates problem for E elections and the destruc-
tive control by partition of candidates problem for E elections.
Given: A set C of candidates, a collection V of voters (each voter’s vote is a tie-free linear order),
and a distinguished candidate p ∈ C.
Question (constructive): Is there a partition of C into C1 and C2 such that p is a winner of the
two-stage election where the winners of subelection (C1, V ) that survive the tie-handling rule
compete against all candidates in C2? Each subelection (in both stages) is conducted using
election system E .
Question (destructive): Is there a partition of C into C1 and C2 such that p is not a winner of
the two-stage election where the winners of subelection (C1, V ) that survive the tie-handling
rule compete against all candidates in C2? Each subelection (in both stages) is conducted
using election system E .
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